104-10182-10071

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III
(Vol. II)
201-259910

INCLUSIVE DATES: JAN 1967 - THRU DEC 1973

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: OTHER AGENCY REPORTS (FBI, ETC.)

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/3/78	3/3/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

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201-259910

14-00000

VOLUME II: January 1967 - September 1973

CLOSED

SEE VOLUME III: January 1974 -

2.67

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET / RYBAT	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief, WH Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO:		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, [illegible]		MICROFILM
SUBJECT: [illegible]/Possible Illegal Arms Shipments to the Caribbean		

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCE: UFPA-1338, 13 September 1973

1. Station passed referenced information to Customs on 13 September 1973. Initial checks by the Station with the FBI, DEA, and Customs revealed no information on the individuals mentioned in reference (Donald H e n r y, John B r o o k s and Bobo B r o w n). Customs was in agreement with the Station's suggestion that a Customs telephone number should be passed to Henry and the case should be put into Customs hands.

2. Henry called Customs on 13 September 1973. A meeting was arranged for that afternoon. Before the meeting took place, however, a Customs officer recognized the name of Brooks as possibly being one of his contacts. Henry was thus met by two Customs officers. On returning from their meeting, the Customs officers notified the Station, and a meeting was arranged to see them on 14 September 1973. Customs provided the following information on Donald Henry.

a. Donald Henry is about 52 years old. He is from Michigan. He lived and went to school in Canada. He moved to Florida about fifteen years ago. He has resided in the Keys for about seven years.

b. Henry was described by Customs as a braggart. They felt, however, that his offer of assistance was genuine. Customs stated that Henry always had a quick answer for any question asked of him, but when the questions got down to specifics his answers were vague.

c. Contrary to initial information, Henry does not have a boat or an airplane. Customs noted, though, that Henry probably has easy access to one. Neither does Henry have an FAA license for flying multi-engine aircraft, although he told Customs he was capable of flying them. Henry has known John Brooks (an alias used by one John W i l b u r)

/Continued/

E2, IMPDET

Dist: 3 - C/WHD	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFPA-1349	DATE: typed 22 September 1973
CROSS REFERENCE TO: D- 1[illegible]-5[illegible]1	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET / RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 1[illegible]06-11-11/3

for about a year. (John Wilbur is described in further detail below.) Henry said he met Wilbur through their association with the Atlantis Dive Center, Inc., Miami, Florida, where Wilbur is employed and where Henry has had a working relationship for some time. The Atlantis Dive Center is owned by one Haley R i c a r d (no Station traces). Ricard, Customs reported, is an unsavory character involved in smuggling activities and would not hesitate to shoot anyone who gets in his way.

d. Henry told Customs that when he bumped into Wilbur at the Atlantis Dive Center recently, they started talking about various ways they could make money. Wilbur told Henry that he (Henry) could smuggle arms for him over to Abaco, and they started discussing that possibility. During the conversation, Henry asked Wilbur who he would be working for. Wilbur mentioned the name of Bobo Brown. He told Henry that Brown, an ex-Special Forces U.S. Army Major, had set up a branch of Defense Systems, Inc., on Abaco for Mitchell L. W e r b e l l, III. Wilbur also intimated that EMERALD was aware of the operation and condoned it. Customs noted that Henry did not pick up the name Bobo or Brown until after they had mentioned a Special Forces major, at which point Henry professed to remember his name.

e. Henry also told Customs, when asked why he had called EMERALD, that he had telephoned the FBI first and was told by them that his information was not in their jurisdiction and was given the phone number for EMERALD. Later, Henry changed his story to the effect that he said he looked in the Miami telephone directory to get the FBI's number and called EMERALD ([illegible]) instead because the latter's number was under the FBI's. (Comment. Not true, both numbers are listed under U.S. Government but on separate pages.)

3. As for John Brooks, Customs reported that this name is an alias used by one John Wilbur, who is about 35 years old. Originally from Massachusetts, Wilbur has been in Florida for several years. He has been in touch with Customs for approximately three years. He was initially brought to Customs' attention over a narcotics case. At the time, Wilbur was working/informing for the FBI, infiltrating both right and left wing youth organizations. He was also dating an airline stewardess who was involved in narcotics smuggling from South America. When Wilbur found out about this illegal activity, he told the FBI who, in turn, put him in touch with Customs.

4. Customs described Wilbur as an ultra-right winger and a soldier-of-fortune who is impressive looking and a smooth talker. Customs said Wilbur is also a fabricator. As an example, they mentioned that Wilbur would read an article in a magazine and shortly thereafter would try to pass it off as his information. He would also contact Customs and tell them every rumor he heard in the hopes that one of the stories would be true so that he could collect a reward. Customs said that although Wilbur is a fabricator and rumor collector, he is dangerous and would do anything for money.

5. Customs noted that Wilbur enjoys playing the role of a man with important contacts and likes to flash money around. They also noted that about four months ago he began living with a rich divorcee. She is in the real estate business and inherited property in the Keys (Duck Key Hotel) from her family. Customs stated that she receives about [illegible] a month

alimony and supposedly has about $400,000 in the bank. She has set Wilbur up in an apartment and furnishes him with spending money. Customs also said that Wilbur seems to be sort of paranoid in that he constantly mentions BKHERALD, not naming BKHERALD as such but referring to it as "the company," "the driving force behind democracy," and so forth.

6. According to Customs, Wilbur began working for Underwater Sports of America, Miami, Florida, as a salesman in the early 1960's. At the time, reported Customs, Underwater Sports was engaged in contractual work for BKHERALD concerning training during preparations for the Bay of Pigs. The last contact Customs had with Wilbur was about three weeks ago. They plan to see him again in the next few days and will attempt to get his side of the story.

7. Customs stated that in spite of the inconsistencies in Henry's story they felt he was making a legitimate offer to assist and thus advised him to proceed along the following lines:

a. Re-contact Wilbur and tell him that he was prepared to fly arms to Abaco, but he would have to see the "front money" first. Customs commented that if Wilbur produces the money, they would have a case; if not, the whole episode could probably be chalked up to Wilbur's delusions.

b. After re-contacting Wilbur and if Wilbur comes up with the money, Henry should attempt to convince him of the necessity of a dry run. If a dry run is not possible, then he is to go ahead with the operation. Arrests would be made by Customs in the States after the arms have been placed in the aircraft and after the personnel involved have boarded the plane.

8. Customs has promised to keep the Station apprised of the case, especially as it pertains to the Bahamas and other areas in the Caribbean.

Alvin C. Thornbrue
Alvin C. THORNBRUE

200-11-11

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FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 259910

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17 September 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Arms Shipment to Abaco Island, Bahamas

1. On 27 August 1973, Alvin C. THORNBRUE discussed [illegible] a case involving the possible violation of [illegible] Act, [illegible] specifically, the transportation of weapons [illegible] in the Bahamas.

2. [illegible] is aware of [illegible] in connection with the dissidents on [illegible] he has been in touch with one Al Sakolsky, a [illegible] reputed organized crime connections. They are aware of [illegible] regarding the shipping of weapons to Abaco [illegible] have been having. They are also aware of [illegible] (201-[illegible]) and [illegible] William [illegible] have been involved in weapons dealings. [illegible] both [illegible] to Abaco Island, and apparently both refused to [illegible].

3. [illegible], on the other hand, has a [illegible] Prime Minister PINDLING. Apparently [illegible] in the Bahamas which had burned down, and he [illegible] PINDLING [illegible] because [illegible] had backed the opposition party. [illegible] has a boat named the "Jerry Scott III", which could transport a large shipment of weapons. The boat had been in dry-dock for approximately three months, until approximately [illegible] August, when it went [illegible]. [illegible] lost track of it for a couple of days, then sighted it [illegible] lost it again. Since approximately [illegible] August, the "Jerry Scott III" has not been sighted again.

4. In line with the possibility of a transfer of weapons [illegible] the "Jerry Scott III" taking place [illegible], [illegible] has been looking for a [illegible] which would be capable of handling the transfer [illegible]. One such vessel was located, the [illegible]. The "[illegible]" is a [illegible] U.S. Navy Patrol [illegible] capable of hitting speeds of [illegible]. It was bought in [illegible] by [illegible], who [illegible] is making $2,[illegible] monthly payments on it. [illegible] noted that it [illegible] to be much too expensive a boat to be used for fishing purposes [illegible] claimed.

[illegible]

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201-[illegible]

02-[illegible]599/C

[illegible] a gale. When the "Larry Scott III" [illegible] Around [illegible] August, the ship's [illegible] took the traps on board the "[illegible]fish." [illegible] the ship immediately turned around and returned [illegible] August, the crew loaded another [illegible] lobster traps aboard [illegible] However, they did not sail until [illegible] August, when [illegible] the Miami River where they are now docked.

[illegible] has the following information concerning [illegible]:

a) [illegible] [illegible] PRESIDENT OF PIONEER PICTURES, INC.

[illegible] ASSOCIATE OF HEWITT MC GILL

[illegible] ASSOCIATE OF [illegible]

[illegible] ASSOCIATE OF [illegible]

[illegible]

MARRIED TO [illegible] BAILIE

[illegible] SISTER TO HEWITT MC GILL

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[illegible] [illegible] (201-[illegible]). [illegible] spent [illegible] in the Miami area during the fall of 19[illegible], in an attempt to dig up information pertaining to [illegible] operations for a book he was supposedly writing. Among some of [illegible]'s [illegible] were [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] who was also noted as a friend of [illegible] [illegible] during [illegible]'s stay in Miami (13 September - [illegible]), and [illegible] (no date ?) was noted as being in contact with [illegible].

5. [illegible], in a conversation on 30 August, stated that when [illegible] sailed from the North on the Miami River, they were going to stop and search it. If nothing was found, they would release it and probably notify the appropriate [illegible] authorities, advising them to put the vessel(s) on "lookout."

[illegible] later, [illegible] was contacted regarding the status of the "[illegible]". According to [illegible], the "[illegible]" had [illegible] and nothing was found, [illegible] continue on its way. [illegible] noted that the appropriate [illegible] officials had been contacted.

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200-11-11/8

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FBI document dated
12 Sept 1973 from Miami
Re: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas
Neutrality Matter - Bahamas

Bureau File: MM 105-21382

FBI document dated
27 July '73 from Miami.
Subject: Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas
Neutrality Matter - Bahamas

Bureau File - MM 105-21382

14-00000

FBI document dated 30 July '73
from Tampa, Fla.

Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger

14-00000

FBI document dated
3 July 73 from New York

Re: Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas

14-00000

FBI document dated
25 June '73 from New York

Subject: Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas

FBI cable dated 2 July 1973

DIRECTOR 62-108665 (date 6-29-73)

from Miami 105-5082

Re: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas
Neutrality Matters - Bahamas

14-00000

FBI cable
2 July 1973
(6/28/73)
TO- Acting Director (62-108665)
FROM- Atlanta (105-5082)
re: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
IS - Bahamas
Neutrality Matters - Bahamas

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FBI 62-108665

16 June 1973

Re: Edwin Margoe;
Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Internal Security - Bahamas

itch WerBel : Gunsmith to the 'Right' Side

oger Williams

ng is excerpted by per- Atlanta magazine.

THE DRIVEWAY that hrough the country estate enage boys. They were handsome in the tradi- fashion, and they looked e quiet, leafy setting But camouflage suit and car- stol in each hand; the M3 "grease gun" tucked and a silencer equipped der the other.

n propelling himself vig- wheelchair, came their fa- Livingston WerBell III 1960s, La soldier of for- anti-communist and one s leading developers of ms and accessories.

d Geoff chatted lightly pons they were carrying temporarily immobilized heel, punctured the con- brief bursts of informa- sniper rifle, one of his roducts. "This weapon VC in six months," he Those VC took only 1.3 ll. Twenty-seven cents Uncle Sam. That's the effectiveness the Army's

er, young Mitch and round after round from nto the bullet-shattered tomobile that serves as rget on the WerBell fir- n Mitch began firing a ed Army .45. The gun and the noise echoed s and treetops. He then ance, smoothly rectan- an Ingram Model 11, "flash and muzzle sup- than firing it. The muz- d, and the only sound click, followed by the et and the pop as it hit

s eerie, almost chilling. young Mitch put the matic and whipped off ts in one second. Geoff he kind of demonstra- ease gun, a standard ine gun and the snip- erBell calls the XM 21 equipped with a sup-

ck to the house, Wer- why the suppressor, a silencer, is so effec- essory. "It hides the reduces the firing etal on metal. You bolt noise without an and it's not worth it. e bolt noise anyway tion so for all prac-

nu weapons given to him by friendly forces in Vietnam, he said, and they were shipped to the States for display in military museums.

Not surprisingly, WerBell has often been called an operative of the Central Intelligence Agency, a charge that angers him only when it is leveled too vehemently. It is not that he has anything against the CIA. He just doesn't, he says, happen to be one of its boys. His paramilitary work, which consists of advising and sometimes directly assisting foreign governments, is done in the employ of what he calls "an independent group of well-intentioned, patriotic Americans." The Birch Society? The Minutemen? A bunch of far-right Texas millionaires? WerBell won't say, other than to insist that it is not the CIA.

It hardly matters, for according to WerBell, it is all in the service not only of freedom and anti-communism but of the U.S. government; he does not supply or advise or fight for regimes not bearing the State Department seal of approval. A heavy percentage of his merchandise goes directly to the U.S. government, which distributes it to its own forces that need silent or exotic weapons. The balance is sold to friendly governments, either directly or through the good offices of the "independent group." He says he does not sell to individuals, not even if they're certified anticommunists.

WerBell takes pains to point out that he is no ordinary arms broker. That is, he is not one of those shadowy figures who sell weapons to both sides at exorbitant prices or who take possession of contraband shipments on the high seas. "We've always adhered to a basic policy: There is only one friend of the United States in a given area, and we deal only with that friend."

What does WerBell peddle? A range of firearms from machine guns to desk-sized cannons, from the meanest-looking weapons to innocent looking swagger sticks that fire a bullet or even a small rocket; an array of techniques — "systems," he calls them — that will help an American soldier or a foreign army hold off insurgent forces, and occasionally, his personal services.

These services present WerBell at his most shadowy. Serving as a combatant in the armed forces of a foreign nation is against U.S. law, and WerBell is understandably reluctant to admit having done so. He describes himself in such terms as "paramilitary" and "adviser," but acquaintances suspect he has been in the thick of the fighting a number of times. He may even have zapped an insurgent or two.

Corporate Setup

THE HEADQUARTERS for his



In Operational Negation of Insurgency and Countersubversion, tied in with Environmental Industries, and began in earnest to develop a line of military hardware. Sons Mitch IV and Geoff became integral parts of the firm. Mitch IV was already a bona fide counter-insurgent. As a 15-year-old, he had spent considerable time with Dad in the Dominican Republic, specializing in underwater probing for safe landing sites. Geoff, two years younger, barely missed out on a Cuban foray; his father took him to Miami a few years ago, but the plans fell through.

One day I sat in WerBell's office as Geoff displayed a number of Military Armament's most unusual weapons. He brought out "the Stinger," a cigar-shaped tube three inches long, weighing 2½ ounces, that fires a .22-caliber cartridge. Nothing visible suggests a gun, and the bullet, on its way out, dislodges a thin plug that disguises the hole at the end of the tiny barrel. WerBell commends the Stinger to secret agents who get caught with the goods and must take "the last resort," that is, shoot themselves.

In the same exotic category is the swagger stick, bound in leather, with silver studs. By pushing between two studs, one can fire a .22 or, with a special model, a small rocket. The bodyguard of Dominican strongman Gen. Antonio Imbert used the rocket model to blast would-be assassins a few years ago. Then there is a small, brass-fitted cannon. It makes a handsome knick-knack for a soldier-politician's desk. It fires, with one simple finger movement, a bullet that will quiet an unruly visitor. More traditionally military is WerBell's "special long-range knocker-outer," a redesigned Remington 9-millimeter rifle that "will plug 'em in the eye at 200 meters."

The bulk of WerBell's business is in sound suppressors and Ingram Model submachine guns. Suppressors can be used on large as well as small weapons, and in fact have been used effectively on the wicked-looking Vulcan machine guns mounted on American helicopters in Vietnam. The Australian Army Journal ran a story calling the Sionics suppressor "superior to anything previously used . . . (with it) it is now possible for the sniper to fire from relatively short ranges, especially when using subsonic projectiles."

WerBell is so enthusiastic about the Ingram Model submachine guns (there are two models, taking different sized cartridges) that he predicts they will eventually make "obsolete every individual weapon in the world." The U.S. Army, he says, is now looking carefully at the Ingram models with an eye toward making them standard equip-

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dedicated to killing people. Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is bankrolled by some of the East's most prominent investment houses; he is its director of international operations. He is also president of a subsidiary called Military Armaments Co., Inc., and because he is in Powder Springs, Military Armaments is there, too. (Behind Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is "a third shadow of which E.I. is a subsidiary"—another tantalizing hint of the CIA.)

Military Armaments may well be a unique American enterprise. Nobody else, WerBell says, is in the business of designing special purpose weapons on such a scale. A good deal of its designing and manufacturing is done under federal license. Silencers, for example, are outlawed by the National Firearms Act, along with sawed-off shotguns, submachine guns and other vestiges of Prohibition era gangland wars.

To manufacture his suppressors, WerBell must pay a special tax of $500 a year, collected by the Treasury Department. The T-men also check periodically to see that his awesome collection of firearms—over 200 individual pieces—is properly registered. Apparently the market for suppressors is not very large because, according to WerBell, his firm is the only one authorized to manufacture them.

WerBell will not discuss the sales or profits of Military Armaments except to say that, after two years of extensive research and development (resulting in "a tax loss of a half million dollars"), the company is now doing very well. It has about 12 employees, including four machinists who work under the direction of Gordon Ingram, who has charge of the design operation and whose name is on the Model 11 submachine gun that young Mitch demonstrated on the firing range.

'Cottage Industry'

INGRAM WORKS in a well-equipped machine shop-lab attached to the main house on the estate, which WerBell likes to call "the farm." WerBell's office is next door to the shop. Its walls are so loaded with weapons that it is a wonder they do not collapse. There are knives and spear guns and pistols and rifles and machine guns, dozens and dozens of them, some purchased, some won in combat, some presented by the appreciative recipients of WerBell's counterinsurgency techniques.

WerBell, who has a sense of humor, calls his enterprise a "cottage industry" and likens himself to "a country doctor . . . I can fall out of the living area upstairs right down to the office." Upstairs is the domain of his German-born wife Hildegard, a pleasant, gray-haired woman who has borne

weapons for the U.S. Army and other counterinsur- *WerBell recovered from a leg injury.*

WerBell six children and put up with his rather unusual way of life. (When he left for the Far East in 1968, he said he'd be gone for a year or more, and he was.)

A Military Profile

MITCHELL WERBELL is a short, wiry man of 52, quick with a quip and quite sensible until he begins talking about communism or other social issues. He has the face and bearing of a Prussian officer, an image he cultivated by wearing a mustache and occasionally a monocle. He often dresses in military clothing of indeterminate origin, and he embellishes the image by talking in slightly clipped sentences peppered with military phrases. There is nothing phony in this. WerBell has a strong attachment to weapons and to warfare, and he has been around them so long that the ideas and styles they foster are an ingrained part of his personality.

He comes by both his militarism and his anticommunism honestly. His father was an officer in the Russian Imperial army, even though he was born in the United States. "It was a tricky situation," says Mitch. "He was a citizen of both the U.S. and Russia. In those days you could do that."

The elder WerBell fought against the Bolsheviks, but before the collapse of the czarist regime he wisely secured an appointment as liaison officer between the Russian and American forces—stationed in the U.S. He lived in this country for the rest of his life, putting his early medical training to use in cancer research.

A legacy from father is Mitch's barely disguised aristocratic sympathies. He has been quoted as saying, "Communism is a substitution of a peasant dictatorship over the aristocracy—I prefer the aristocracy." He is without question an elitist. Not surprisingly, his elite is composed of superpatriots and military men.

Mitchell WerBell was born in Pennsylvania, shortly after his Russian-American father and his Scottish-born mother arrived in the U.S. at the end of World War I. His parents traveled a good deal, here and abroad, and Mitch traveled with them, picking up his education as he went. He got a degree in journalism from the University of Pennsylvania. In World War II, he joined the OSS, and served with a unit behind Japanese lines in China, rising to the rank of captain and acquiring a taste for guerrilla-type warfare he would never lose.

WerBell moved to Atlanta shortly after the war and went to work in advertising in a department store. Soon he was head of the department, and soon after that he went on his own.

In the mid-'50s, WerBell pulled out of his agency and then formed his own public relations firm. "I'd already been drifting into international PR," WerBell says, "using my family background. I had tremendous contacts in Europe, and I moved into the Far East, too." How much of this moving in was military, WerBell won't say, but his business took on more and more of what he calls a "geopolitical" flavor.

Before long, he was dabbling in Latin American dictatorships. "Before Fidel took over in Cuba, we were working closely with Batista." He adds with a grin, "Our function was to keep Batista in power, although the U.S. government was looking favorably on Fidel at that point."

From all this, even WerBell doesn't know exactly how, came a passionate concern about communism. "I decided to devote whatever time I could to anticommunist activities," he says. "At first it was sort of a hobby, but then it became my main drive in life. What I'm doing now"—here he gestures at the arsenal on his office walls—"affords me a damned good living. But the living is not why I do it."

The Heart of It

IN 1948, WHILE anticommunism was still a hobby, albeit a paying hobby, WerBell purchased the Dobbs estate. He installed rudimentary design facilities and began experimenting with weapons of counterinsurgency, weapons he believed had the best chance of preventing Communist takeovers in the small, underdeveloped nations of Asia and Latin America. "I realized that in counterinsurgency, the primary problem was a lack of depth in weaponry. People say, 'Win the hearts of the enemy, and you'll win the fight.' That's a lot of bull. The best way to get their hearts, if they're the enemy, is to shoot 'em and cut the hearts out."

While he experimented with weapons—quietly, to avoid problems with the federals—WerBell proceeded with his personal brand of geopolitics. He made himself available to anticommunist regimes that wanted help in fighting off one band of insurgents or another. In the process, he became friendly with a number of Latin America's political strongmen. They were delighted to discover a Nore-Americano who felt as they did about the need for stable, anticommunist regimes, especially their regimes, and who had both the savvy and the guts to help preserve them.

His first major paramilitary operation was in the Dominican Republic during the 1965 revolt. He was, of course, on the side of the government, which was fending off allegedly Communist insurgents; the United States was on its side, too. WerBell wound up in the midst of the fighting. He was the second Dominican government man to reach the Ozama River, scene of the major battle.

Ellsworth Bunker, then U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, became highly exercised over WerBell's activities and his hawkish views on the conflict (WerBell opposed a cessation of hostilities and establishment of a coalition government). Bunker considered trying to toss WerBell out of the country, but nothing came of it. WerBell's "independent group"—CIA, Texas millionaires or whatever—saw to that.

WerBell was already active in the anti-Castro movement, and he brought to it a sense of dash and discipline that the ragtag, bickering bunch of Cuban exiles had seldom seen. Perhaps his major anti-Castro exploit was a speedboat foray into Camarioca, on Cuba's southern coast. The mission was to drop a swimmer, apparently a spy, offshore, and to pick up the family of an exile leader. The boat, flying the Confederate flag on the radio antenna, foundered in high seas, and the raiding party was captured. The Cubans, the story goes, did not know what to make of the brash WerBell, and he and his pals wound up stealing a Castro boat and spiriting some 16 anti-Castroites out of the country before they themselves returned to the United States.

Vietnam Superhawk

IN THE LATE '60s, WerBell turned his attention to Southeast Asia. He is, of course, a superhawk on Vietnam, and would be happy if the U.S. were also fighting communism in all its neighboring countries. He was in Thailand, "working closely with the supreme command," for months, promoting the sales of his weapons and systems. "I showed them things like surveillance equipment and night vision equipment, stuff that lets you surprise the hell out of the bastards." Did he do any fighting himself? WerBell chuckles. "I ain't supposed to be shooting the stuff, just demonstrating how to shoot it."

Three years ago, WerBell's weapons business became promising enough for him to go into it full time. He organized a firm called Sionics (for Studies

Armaments makes the case, too), complete with suppressor and six magazines.

Business Is Business

DOES WERBELL feel a twinge of conscience about providing the world with such deadly and efficient weapons? No. "I see no reason to be concerned," he says. "We're supplying a certain product that is unfortunately a part of the civilized world. As long as people exist, there's going to be an arms business. I don't see much difference between our supplying arms to combatants and a surgical supply house supplying gauze to bind up the wounds inflicted."

There is his anticommunist argument, too. WerBell is fighting the Communist menace; it is a fight that must be won and weapons are needed to win it.

Contrary to cynical opinion, Powder Springs was not named in honor of WerBell and his enterprise. WerBell, in fact, stays as aloof from the local community as possible. His house is so well-stocked, it is practically self-sufficient save for occasional trips to the grocery and liquor stores. There has been, from time to time, anti-WerBell feeling in Powder Springs. WerBell declares, "The hell with it. Who cares? I tell 'em I'm prepared to purchase their property if they don't like the area."

He does not suffer from loneliness, however. There is a steady stream of visitors and customers, foreigners as well as Americans. A few weeks ago WerBell's son-in-law, an Air Force lieutenant colonel, flew in from Ohio, mainly to see what was new around the shop; he hadn't been by in several months, he said, "and things change awfully quickly around here." The day I was there, the colonel and WerBell swapped ideas on ridding the State Department of no-win policy makers and on bringing the enemy to its knees, or its grave, in Vietnam.

WerBell recalls with relish one particular visitor. He came from the State Department a few years back, and according to WerBell, he said, "The functions of the foreign policies of the United States are the business of the State Department in Washington, not of Mitchell WerBell in Powder Springs, Georgia." WerBell's reply? "You can't print it. It was all in Anglo-Saxon words." But that was the old, swashbuckling WerBell. The new, low-profile WerBell says with a grin, "My present policy is that I agree with that theory completely. Period."

If actions to the contrary speak too loudly, they, like WerBell's weapons, can always be suppressed by the man himself. Meanwhile, Mitch and his "independent group" march on.

EK

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TO: C/WHD

FROM: COS, WH/MIAMI

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TROPIC®

THE MIAMI HERALD SUNDAY MAGAZINE

July 1, 1973 Vol. 7 No. 25



THE COVER: Arms dealer Mitchell Livingston WerBell III lives in an 007 world of guns and intrigues. Among the guns is his briefcase with a built-in machine gun that fires whenever the right button is pushed. Among the intrigues is his present preoccupation with what happens to Abaco when the Bahamas goes independent this month. For the full story, turn to Page 18. Photograph by John Pineda.

FEATURES

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
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
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Photographs by John Pineda










Facing page.
Mitch WerBell III in the upstairs gun room of his Georgia home. Behind him, left to right, are son-in-law Paul Routhier, a retired Air Force colonel and president of WerBell's Defense Systems International, Bennett Bartlett, Defense Systems' chairman of the board; and son Mitchell. Top left, moving clockwise: A uniformed WerBell employee practices firing a weapon on the Georgia estate-armory; a belt buckle that doubles as a knife, à la agent 007. Mitch WerBell IV points out Abaco on a map of the Bahamas

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POWDER KEG AT POWDER SPRINGS

The flamboyant son of a Cossack Colonel, Mitchell WerBell III has been involved in several Caribbean adventures and misadventures. Now, as the Bahamas nears independence, the wealthy arms-dealer has his sights set on Abaco . . .

By William R. Amlong

"Do I look like a guy who has to se[ll] himself as a soldier of fortune?"

Mitchell Livingston WerBell III is th[e] son of a cavalry colonel in the Russia[n] Imperial Army. He has stayed, more [or] less, in the family business: bedevilin[g] Bolsheviks. And now he sees himself n[ot] as some ragtag gunrunner, but as a ver[y] substantial figure in the shaping of worl[d] affairs through free-enterprise ge[o]politics.

His disclaimer about not looking like [a] soldier of fortune, however, doesn't qu[ite] make his point; for that is indeed wh[at] Mitch WerBell looks like — or at lea[st] what a montage of James Cagney, Al[ec] Guinness and Walter Mitty would lo[ok] like. There's the walrus moustache a[nd] the khaki bush jacket with the should[er] patch of the First Airborne Division [of] the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. [A] monocle and a swagger stick are ke[pt] handy. The overall impression is that t[he] man just stepped out of the Briti[sh] officers' mess in old Burma.

But he is not in Burma, nor in Vi[etnam]

Three uniformed ex-military men, all under the employ of WerBell, line up for target practice at the Powder Springs compound

POWDER KEG

Continued

nam, nor even in one of the sugarcane fields of South Florida, where counter-revolutionaries are wont to drill and target-practice for yet another assault on Castro's Cuba. Rather, he is sitting in the upstairs gun room of his home in Powder Springs, Ga., a 66-acre estate-armory situated amidst the rolling red-clay hills and pine forests 25 miles northwest of downtown Atlanta. It is a place where the pastoral air is occasionally shattered by the flashing of a red light that goes on whenever the electronic gate is opened, by the staccato barking of machine guns from the test firing range or by the pulsating roar of a combat helicopter hovering low overhead on a test flight.

It is from this base of operations that, it appears, Mitch WerBell has been meddling again, this time in the affairs of the about-to-become sovereign state of the Bahamas.

His activities — although no one is completely sure just what they entail — have prompted Bahamas Prime Minister Lynden Pindling to denounce WerBell and attorney Edwin Marger, an associate, on the floor of the Bahamian Parliament. Pindling called them "international fortune hunters" with "designs on the territorial sovereignty of the Bahamas."

Werbell's involvement in the Bahamas — as an advisor to a faction that wants the island of Abaco either to remain a Crown Colony or to become a separate nation when the rest of the Bahamas becomes fully independent on July 10 — has also prompted some concern by the U.S. State Department's Caribbean Affairs Desk.

It is not a completely unfamiliar experience to WerBell to have elements of the United States government at least concerned — if not outright displeased — with some of his free-lance foreign-policy maneuvers. He relishes recalling how a visitor flew down to Georgia once to give him the message: "The functions of the foreign policies of the United States are the business of the State Department in Washington, not of Mitchell WerBell in Powder Springs, Ga." In another incident, a congressional subcommittee questioned him about his role in an aborted attempt to launch an invasion of Haiti from South Florida.

The subcommittee, the investigations arm of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, was concerned with the role played in the invasion preparations by CBS News. The network was attempting to film a documentary on the military coup being planned by an alliance of Haitian and Cuban exiles. The Haitians wanted to topple Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier; the Cubans wanted to establish an anti-Castro base in Haiti. CBS was steered into the project by Andrew St. George, a freelance journalist-adventurer who also introduced Producer Jay McMullen to WerBell in the process.

The network, after spending upwards of $170,000 on the proposed documentary, *Project Nassau*, decided to scrap it. "As it is," a CBS News vice president wrote in a Dec. 13, 1966, memo, "we see simply the non-adventures of a rag-tag crew next to whom Duvalier himself looks good, a gang openly flouting U.S. law, in the end to no purpose."

The answers to "why" WerBell got involved are, in the language of the subcommittee report, "at variance" with each other:

Answer No. 1: " . . . I felt then and I feel now, and I will always feel that any effort or any activity that any American can give to a group that is attempting to kill the boil and cancer of communism in the Western Hemisphere deserves every effort. This was my fundamental reason for going into it. This was why I agreed to assist them and why I did everything I could to assist them up to the point where I felt the whole program was ridiculous."

Answer No. 2: "I took this whole project as a rather entertaining comedy. I'm afraid I approached it in this connection and I continued to do so. I felt that this was a very amateurish attempt at something which I didn't know really what was going on, and it was an interlude of entertainment as far as I'm concerned."

The role he played is also unclear. From the point that CBS entered the situation in May of 1966, WerBell appeared at various times to be a network consultant, a CIA operative, a CIA operative impostor, a leader of the invasion, a U.S. government spy on the invasion, a gunrunner and a wired-for-sound observer in an attempt to shake down the Haitian consul in Miami for $200,000 to call off the invasion.

Suffice it to say that the entire episode was typified by the fact that the 68-foot sloop *Poor Richard*, a boat WerBell had leased for the expedition, was repossessed while WerBell and others had it docked at the Ocean Reef motel in Key Largo. "The boat never had anything on it ex-



cept a few good, long drinking sessions," WerBell told congressmen.

Nevertheless, the U.S. government raided the training area for the would-be invaders, seized their arms and arrested them in January, 1967, about two months after WerBell had gone home. Seven persons were indicted for conspiring to violate U.S. neutrality laws — including WerBell. Charges against WerBell, however, were dropped on orders of then-Attorney General Ramsey Clark.

WerBell now declines to discuss the mechanics of how the charges against him were dropped, except to say that he was "in constant contact with the government" during his participation in the invasion attempt and that he "did nothing wrong." In 1970, however, WerBell told an Atlanta magazine writer, "When you work for the company, they take care of you."

"The company" is generally used as a euphemism for the Central Intelligence Agency — an arm of government WerBell says now he has never had anything to do with, except to sell it some guns. The company he was talking about, he says, was CBS. Over the years, however, WerBell has spoken often of his association with the Company. Producer McMullen quoted WerBell to the congressmen as saying he had "previous experience" with "the company." "And when I asked him what company he meant, he said the CIA," McMullen said.

"Everybody always gets that impression about any goddam thing we do," WerBell says. It is a conclusion that is neither difficult nor illogical. It may not, however, be accurate.

But what, then, was Mitch WerBell, wearing camouflage fatigues and a shoulder-holstered rocket pistol, doing in the lead tank — which is where he claims he was — in the Dominican Republic that summer of 1965 as government forces double-timed it to the Ozama River? The tanks were attempting to capture as much territory as possible before a noon cease-fire took effect; instead, they were beaten back by ill-armed rebels at the bridge.

Or what was he doing in Vietnam in 1968, with what WerBell claims was "the simulated rank of major-general" supplied by the U.S. Air Force as he demonstrated his firm's revolutionary silenced submachine gun to a South Vietnamese general?

To questions such as these, WerBell's standard reply is, "I guess I'm just lucky." More than just luck, however, WerBell's propensity for being in the crucial place at the crucial time seems to stem from a combination of machismo, the profit motive, a knack for developing [illegible] radical weaponry and a plug-in to the Old Boy Network.


The Old Boy Network — "And don't you ever kid yourself that there isn't such a thing," says WerBell — is the cloak-and-dagger types' answer to the union hiring hall. It is a loosely structured help wanted-situation wanted grapevine. "I became friends with a bunch of guys who are now four- and five-star generals," recalls WerBell of his days as an OSS captain behind Japanese lines in World War II.

Memorabilia of the OSS days and subsequent adventures hang in WerBell's home and in his psyche. The walls of both his upstairs den and downstairs "war room" are decorated with dozens of hunting (upstairs) and military (downstairs) weapons. Six unsheathed swords are mounted on the door of the liquor cabinet. Two glass display cases in the den, each locked, contain handguns ranging from standard .45 automatics to single-shot assassination pistols. Daggers, bayonets and throwing knives fill the in-between spaces as bric-a-brac. Photographs of short, slant-eyed generals hang on walls and stand on tables. Between two wild boar heads above the den entrance is a framed certificate from the Vietnamese Airborne.

The biggest war souvenir, though, isn't on WerBell's wall. It is in his head — the way a man of 55 acts after more than 20 years of being in and on the fringes of violent conflicts. Some of it, obviously, is affectation. Some of it is genuine. And some of it just seems strange to an outsider

Thus the sincere man does not do or say that which he would be ashamed of were it brought to light. His uprightness of spirit enables him to walk upright and confident among his fellowmen. His presence is a strong protection, and his words are direct and powerful because they are true. Whatever may be his work, it prospers. - James Allen

ANSWER TO TODAY'S PUZZLE



It seems that everyone associated with WerBell takes gun in hand for target practice at one time or another. Bennett Bintliff, chairman of the board of Defense Systems International, plays marksman with a handgun

POWDER KEG

Continued

to the world of a fellow like Mitch WerBell.

But there it is: the bush jacket and the monacle. The belt buckle that conceals a "survival knife." The electronic gate and the two guard dogs, a German shepherd named Fritz and a Doberman called Mal (for Evil). The electronic sweep by the two phones to detect transmitting or bugging devices. The Scotch whisky, poured neat — no water, no ice.

WerBell drifted into his present line of work during the mid-1950s after a brief but flourishing post-war career in advertising; he joined and rose to the head of the advertising department of Rich's, a major Atlanta department store. He then founded his own ad firm. His first step was to get involved in international public relations and anti-communism: one of his clients, he says, was the Batista government. From there, he eased into the arms and intrigue business.

WerBell's talent for designing weapons recalls that of Q., the fictional British Secret Service armorer for Ian Fleming's super-spy, James Bond. At his Powder Springs retreat, WerBell has designed a submachine gun disguised as a briefcase, an effective noise-and-flash suppressor for automatic weapons, a cigar that fires a single bullet and a swagger stick that is actually a mini-rocket launcher.

WerBell's sorties into strife-torn areas appear at times to be merely the business trips of a traveling salesman whose line happens to be machine guns. At other times, however — such as during the Dominican revolt and in Thailand — his purpose seems to be less clear.

His gullet warmed by a few gulps of neat whisky, WerBell will recount some of these past adventures, albeit reluctantly and in vague terms because of the new, sober image he is attempting to project. But as the camouflage outfit hangs next to the dark suit in WerBell's closet, the flamboyance of the old gunrunning and tank-riding Mitch WerBell every now and then surfaces in the behavior of the conservative geopolitical advisor, Mitchell L. WerBell III.

While in London recently, as Parliament prepared for the final vote endorsing Bahamian independence, WerBell let it be known to a reporter for the *London Daily Mirror* (circulation five million) that he was: 1) four-square for the cause of the Council for a Free Abaco, and 2) recruiting British mercenaries "for a project I have in mind." Abaco? "Who said it was Abaco?" said WerBell. The fruit of the interview was a front-page story headlined: "Mutiny in Paradise . . . The Island That Wants to Stay British . . . A Call Goes Out for Mercenaries."

Such were the initial tactics in the Battle of Abaco, a cause that, for awhile in the British press, seemed second in anticipated ferocity only to the Catholics-vs.-Protestants strife in Northern Ireland. Joining WerBell as a comrade-in-press release was Lt.-Col. Colin (Mad Mitch) Mitchell, a right-wing House of Commons member and a hero of the Battle of Aden during his days with the Argyle & Sutherland Highlanders. Mitchell, who was muttering to the British press about secret missions to Abaco and the such, recently visited WerBell in Powder Springs, WerBell said.

While there are some people who admire flamboyance such as WerBell's, there are others who don't. Among those others are WerBell's former business associates, a group of New York investment bankers who bought WerBell and Bennett B. Bintliff, an associate, out of the Military Armament Corp. (MAC) that the pair had founded. "He's been headline press all over England, and we're just a quiet little manufacturing company," said Rosser Scott Reeves III, chairman of the board of MAC's parent company, Quantum Corp. "He's a loudmouth. Basically, when you're dealing with a country, the country would like to see responsible executives who are discreet, who will transact business — not tell war stories."

Reeves, however, says he doesn't dislike WerBell — he just doesn't want to be associated with him in the arms business. "I like him a great deal. He's amusing and he's a character. But letting him run Colt or letting him run MAC is like turning loose a high-school hot-rodder to run General Motors."

WerBell and his associates in Powder Springs have now reincorporated under the name of Defense Systems International Inc. and have hired away several of MAC's former weapons specialists. They are not overly fond of Reeves and his people either. "Tunnel vision" is one phrase they use to describe MAC's preoccupation with gun sales.

Defense Systems International, they say, does not suffer from such tunnel vision. They are deeply involved in geopolitics — whatever geopolitics are. And from the list of activities that WerBell and his partners tick off, geopolitics seems to be about anything they want it to be: arms sales, military advice, investment banking, economic development, security work, public relations, international lawyering.

The people who hire the firm, WerBell says, "are interested in an organization that's capable of doing the political, geopolitical, clandestine and economic operations that we're capable of. We operate

WILLIAM R. AMLONG is a Herald staff writer.

14-00000



"in 22 different countries. If somebody said to us tomorrow, 'We need a complete government, from a minister of health to a minister of welfare to the guy who presses the buttons to make the elevator go,' we could do it."

Just how much demand there is for pre-packaged governments — or how much capability Defense Systems International has for providing them — is uncertain. What the firm would appear to have an obvious capacity for, however, is warfare. Its president and chief administrator is WerBell's son-in-law, Paul Routhier, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant-colonel who also doubles as the company's air-war expert. On the staff are various other ex-military types, ranging from a Marine sergeant to several retired colonels. Among its activities, says Routhier, is the sale to smaller, U.S.-approved nations of armament packages, including not only hardware but also training.

What Defense Systems International does not do, its principals insist, is to make wars or shoot people themselves. If they did, they say, they could go to jail for violating U.S. neutrality laws. Nor does it sell the guns to shoot people with, unless the U.S. State Department approves, they say. And the State Department isn't about to approve the sale of any arms by WerBell to the Abaconian secessionists. No matter, says WerBell. "We have no intention of arming Abaco in any shape or fashion. Anyway, they have more arms down there than we have here."

So why, then, is there a photograph lying about of the Hon. W. E. Errington (Eric) Watkins, a member of the Bahamian Parliament from Abaco, clenching a cigar between his teeth and test-firing one of WerBell's silenced submachine guns? The answer may well be far from sinister: as a tourist drinks beer when he visits Busch Gardens, a visitor to WerBell's house does not normally leave without firing off a clip or two through the machine gun. It is an instrument of which WerBell is duly proud: a rapid-fire automatic weapon that, when equipped with the silencer, makes about as much noise as an electric typewriter.

The novelty of WerBell's weaponry aside, however, there remain the questions of how WerBell got involved with the Free Abaco faction, what he is doing for it and how he is getting paid.

The leadership of the Council for a Free Abaco appears to be composed of two men, Watkins and Charles (Chuck) Hall. Watkins, the chairman, is a retired Bahamas policeman and former Nassau resident. He was elected to the House of Assembly from Abaco on the Free National Movement ticket last September. He says he has known WerBell for some 20 years. Hall, a Nassau TV- and radio-store owner, is a direct descendant of the white Tories who settled Abaco immediately after the American Revolution rather than be separated from the British Crown. He says he was referred to WerBell through persons he met while organizing a demonstration against allowing Air Cuba to service the Nassau airport. "The people I met there, basically right-wing, were able to put me on to WerBell." Hall is secretary of the council.

With a budget that they will describe no more specifically than to say it is less than $50,000 and made up entirely of small contributions from Bahamians, the group is paying WerBell and Marger an undisclosed fee through Zeta, a dummy corporation founded solely for the Abaco venture. Why it was necessary to establish such a company is unclear. Of its name, WerBell says, "I think it's Greek for war."

But just what the Zeta Co. or Operation Zeta — it's referred to as both — is doing for the Abaconian secessionists is somewhat uncertain. So far, there has been some lobbying of Parliament in London by Marger, a lawyer with U.S. lobbying experience and a background in international law, but about as un-British a fellow as there is. There have been some saber-rattling press releases to the British newspapers. There have been conversations with Mad Mitch. And there has even been note of the plight of the Abaconian secessionists on the editorial page of the *Atlanta Journal*: three sympathetic columns written by John Crown, a retired Marine

POWDER KEG

Continued

officer and acquaintance of WerBell's who was introduced to Watkins. There is also some talk about approaching the Organization of Americen States and the United Nations. And about a referendum on Abaco July 9 — the day before Bahamian independence — on whether to unilaterally declare Abaco a free nation. "We are putting to bear all our activity and friends to tell the world, 'Here's a country that doesn't want to go this way,' " says WerBell.

The accuracy of that assessment of feeling on Abaco can be questioned. Many of the Abaconians who originally opposed separation from the Crown abandoned the movement as fruitless in December, when the British government decreed that the Bahamas — all of the Bahamas — would become independent. Nor was there ever complete opposition throughout Abaco to the Pindling government and independence: of the two Parliament members elected by the island's 6,500 residents, the one other than Watkins is a Pindling supporter and a backer of independence. The impetus for the Free Abaco movement, both Pindling and Minister of External Affairs Paul Adderly have charged, comes from outside the Bahamas. "I still think that what they are basically involved in is the stealing of land," Adderly said in a recent interview. And indeed, the majority of the people on Abaco know very little of WerBell and Marger outside of what they read in the British press.

WerBell says his motivations are strictly anti-communist. A far right-winger — he described himself to a newsman as "to the right of Attila the Hun" — WerBell sees the Bahamas as islands ripe for communism. "Every goddam single symptom that was present in Cuba exists in the Bahamas today," he says.

WerBell's opinion of the Pindling government and of the Bahamas' political climate is one which many observers of the Bahamas do not share. Although the overwhelming majority of the islanders are black and have become very assertive concerning racial equality during the past decade or so, the Bahamas have been deeply influenced by English tradition. The Anglican and Baptist Churches, both conservative institutions, are heavily represented. And the U.S. government is ardently courting Pindling as a friend.

But WerBell, son and heir of a Cossack colonel, sees the rise of Bolshevism where others see the peaceful emergence of a new democratic nation. And the question is whether or not to take him seriously as he sits in Powder Springs with his bush jacket and walrus moustache, talking of hiring mercenaries and of naming a company after what he thinks is the Greek letter meaning war.

The State Department, meanwhile, is keeping a close watch. "You can't write a man off as a clown," said one source, "if he has a warehouse full of arms. We take him seriously enough to want to know what he's up to." [T]

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State Dept Cable LONDON 5390
dated 9 MAY '73
Subject: Alleged Anti-Bahamian
Independence Activities in
London

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Port Louis

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT: Headquarter's Traces on the Military Armament Corporation.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: AR: As Stated in Paragraph Three

Reference: Port Louis 12011, 17 May 1973.

1. There are no Headquarter's traces on Dr. George A. Winkler, but there are traces on the Military Armament Corporation and its Board Chairman, Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III (201-259910). In 1967 WerBell organized a firm called SIONICS, Incorporated (Studies in Operational Negation of Insugency and Counter Subversion), specializing in producing silencers. In 1970, WerBell merged with Quantum Ordnance Bankers and the new firm was named the Military Armament Corporation with WerBell as Chairman of the Board.

2. WerBell was born on 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He served in the OSS and was of interest to BKHERALD in 1959 when it was discovered that he was involved with anti-Castro plotters in the Dominican Republic. He was granted a POA in August 1959 but this was cancelled in October 1959 when his information proved to be of little value and it was suspected that he was using BKHERALD funds to promote personal interests. He has subsequently attempted to pass himself as LNBUZZ connected and as a BKHERALD employee. Mr. WerBell's lengthy 201 file shows a long history of his appearing in areas and situations where he can make a fast buck. He is characterized as unscrupulous, a "wheeler dealer", and a promotor of grandiose schemes. WOTACK advises that the arms WerBell offers for sale are of good quality, but that the selling price is considered excessive.

3. In that Mr. WerBell is a WODUAL citizen, the above information should not be passed to CGPAT/1. However, the Station could inform CGPAT/1 that the Military Armament Corporation has an unsavory reputation and, although it may have permission from NVIDEA to export arms, it has no LNBUZZ connections and that any dealings with the corporation should be approached with extreme caution.

Luther S. PENAGELIA

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Orig & 1-COS, Port Louis

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	AQPW 240	29 May 73 4 JUN 1973
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COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS	30.5.73	[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/AF/S	31 May 73	Robert E. MacDonald

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: VWVAPOR/Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

Forwarded under separate cover is a report from LNERGO dated 12 September 1973 on Subject.

Louise B. PERLBINDER

Attachment: U/S/C

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att., u/s/c

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	UFPW-784	Typed: 12 October 1973
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-0259910

1 - 201-0259910

1 - WH/7/Car Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/7/Car	Esther Lucero	ar	4133/1249

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/7	12 Oct 73	E. James McTighe

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 3

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STAFF

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CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 403810

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE F1, AR 6, CI/SO,

DISSEM BY: 38

PER ___ #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

TO: WH/MIAMI.

VWVAPOR

(#53419)

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY STATE 80538 DATED 27 APRIL 1973 (POUCHING COPY):

A. BRITISH EMBOFF WASHINGTON GAVE NOTE TO DEPARTMENT ON BEHALF OF BAHAMAS GOVT (GOBI) ON 27 APRIL 1973 RE NEW REPORTS IN UNITED KINGDOM CONCERNING TWO PEOPLE INVOLVED ANTI-BAHAMAS INDEPENDENCE ACTIVITIES. REPORTS IDENTIFY TWO PEOPLE AS U.S. CITIZENS. THEY ARE EDWIN MARGER, FORTY-FOUR YEAR OLD ATTORNEY, WHO CLAIMS REPRESENT "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO," AND MITCHEL BELL, (SIC) FIFTY-FIVE YEAR OLD ARMS DEALER. GOBI HAS UNCONFIRMED INFO THAT MARGER IS FLORIDA ATTORNEY AND BELL PRESIDENT OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL INC, POWDER SPRING, GEORGIA. "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO" UNKNOWN TO GOBI.

B. NEWS REPORTS SAY BOTH MEN ARRIVED UK CLAIMING REPRESENT ABACO CITIZENS WHO WANT REMAIN BRITISH, AND INTERESTED HIRING BRITISH MERCENARIES THO NEITHER MAN SAID MERCENABRIES INTENDED FOR ABACO.

AN
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WH/DC/A

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

03 MAY 73
201-259910

2.51

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE → ALIGN

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 3

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

403810

DISSEM BY:

PER #

C. GOBI REPORTED THIS INFO SINCE ACTIVITIES, IF TRUE, MIGHT CONSTITUTE CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST GOBI.

D. GOBI REQUESTS U.S. GOVT INQUIRE INTO CONDUCT THESE TWO MEN RE REPORTED ACTIVITIES AGAINST GOBI, TAKING ACTION AS NECESSARY.

E. STATE COMMENT LABELLED FYI: ARMS DEALER IS MITCHEL W E R B E L L OF POWDER SPRING, GEORGIA, WHO KNOWN TO DEPARTMENT AS ADVENTURER WHO INVOLVED IN SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN OTHER CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. END FYI.

2. FOLLOWING SUMMARY NASSAU 546 DATED 27 APRIL 1973 (POUCHING COPY):

A. MIN EXT AFF A D D E R L E Y GAVE INFO COPY STATE 80538 TO EMBOFF IN NASSAU WITH COMMENT THAT GOBI NOT ASKING UK AUTHORITIES TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS.

B. ADDERLEY SAID ABACO LEADER LEONARD T H O M P S O N AND MR. S T R A T T O N, ONE OF MAIN FINANCIAL BACKERS OF ABACO MOVEMENT, ASSURED PM RECENTLY THEY NOT SUPPORTING SECESSION THROUGH VIOLENCE. (EMBOFF COMMENT: THIS IN LINE WITH INFO RECEIVED THAT MODERATE ELEMENTS ON ABACO DISASSOCIATING FROM EXTREMISTS AROUND ERRINGTON WATKINS)

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

403810

PER #

C. NASSAU "GUARDIAN" 27 APRIL 1973 HAS CABINET OFFICE PRESS RELEASE WITH NOTE TEXT, AND REPORTS THAT ABACO ERRINGTON WATKINS AND FRIEND, CHARLES "CHUCK" H A L L, IN LONDON SEEKING SUPPORT FOR "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO."

D. SAME ISSUE HAS WATKINS'S DENIAL HE IN LONDON FOR MERCENARIES OR THAT HE WOULD RESORT TO OR CONDONE VIOLENCE. HE SAID HE LOBBYING HAVE BAHAMAS INDEPENDENCE BILL AMENDED TO EXCLUDE INDEPENDENCE FOR ABACO AND SAID WILL DO EVERYTHING LEGALLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY TO ACHIEVE WISHES AND DESIRES OF PEOPLE. WATKINS SAID GOBI CHARGES WERE EFFORT TO DISCREDIT HIM.

E. DEPARTMENT COMMENT: PROMPT RELEASE OF NOTE TO LOCAL PRESS AND RADIO SUGGESTS IT EXERCISE FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSUMPTION.

3. POUCHING SUMMARY EXTENSIVE FILE ON WERBELL (201-259910).

4. FILE 201-259910. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 2 MAY 1973
ORIG: EASTON C. WARNER: KMS
UNIT: WH/7/CAR
EXT: 7493/1956

AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

2.51 William [signature]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019722

14-00000

FBI cable dated 7 May '73
Subject: Edwin Marger:
Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
IS - GREAT BRITAIN

14-00000

FBI document dated 13 June '73.
from Atlanta, Ga.
Subject: Edwin Marger;
Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, III

14-00000

FBI document dated
16 Mar 73
(re - Mitchell Werbell)

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 25 1972
MICROFILMED

302449

SECRET

DIG:	STAFF
DIRECTOR	

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY: 2/72   PER: 21   # 6

CONF: C/WH/6   INFO: FILE, VR, ... DDP, ADDP, C/WH/...
clet, cl/WHSC 2, c/FI,

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 056072
WH-SECR

TOTAL COPIES

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT PLMHKSYSS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 20757 (IN 634371)

B. MEXICO CITY 20758 (IN 634378)

1. MITCHELL L. WERBELL, III (201-257910) IS DIRECTOR OF GUIANTON CORP WHICH PARENT COMPANY OF MILITARY ARMAMENT CORP AND DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL. HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 ON WERBELL WHO HAS LONG HISTORY POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE CAN MAKE FEW FAST BUCKS. HE CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, WHEELER DEALER AND PROMOTOR OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID 1959 WHEN BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED PROVIDE EKTRUST WITH INFO ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN CARIBBEAN. HE GRANTED POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS CANCELLED OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFO PROVED BE OF LITTLE VALUE AND IT SUSPECTED THAT HE USING EKTRUST FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. HE BORN 8 MAR 1918, PHILADELPHIA.

2. EKTRUST HAS SPENT LAST TEN YEARS DISCLAIMING WERBELL WHO HAS REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED PROMOTE SELF AS REP OF LNLUTE AND EKTRUST. IT PROBABLE THAT WERBELL USING CAMARGO AND TORRES AS FRONT MEN FOR

ORIG	UNIT		DATE
AUTH	UNIT		SIGNATURE
RELEASE	UNIT		SIGNATURE

OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT	OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT
				17 AUG 1972	
B201-272522			CS COPY		
B201-294213					

2.48   201-259910

14-00000

ORIGINATING MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: | UNIT: STAFF | CITE: DIRECTOR | 302449

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

CONF INFO RF, VR, FILE

TOTAL COPIES

HIS OPERATIONS BECAUSE WERBELL SO BADLY BURNED WITH LNLUTE. ALL ABOVE MAY BE PASSED BNDD WITH CAVEAT THAT IT NOT BE PASSED FOREIGN NATIONALS BECAUSE WERBELL LNLUTE CITIZEN.

3. TRACES ON BAUMGART PENDING. WILL FORWARD WHEN RECEIVED.

4. FILE: 201-259910; 201-298213; 201-292522. E2 IMPDET UN-SK

SISH.H

ORIG: [illegible] | UNIT: [illegible] | DATE: [illegible]

AUTH: [illegible] | UNIT: [illegible]

RELEASE: [illegible] | UNIT: [illegible]

OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT	OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			

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14-00000

FBI document dated
18 April '72
(re: Mitchell L. Werbell, III -
Assoc. w/ Haitian exiles)

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
John K. Greaney Assistant General Counsel	7521	DATE: 8 November 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. General Counsel			LRH	1-3. I have reviewed the attached transcript and find nothing classified. I feel, however, it would be advisable for Ermal Geiss to sign the reply since WerBell's counsel has sent me written interrogatories in this proceedings. Lawrence R. Houston, Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel
2.				
3. DD/P 3C34 Hqs.		8 Nov 71		
4.				
5. DD/SEC 4E60 Hqs.				CONCURRENCE: [signature] Deputy Director for Plans
6.				
7.				
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15.				2.45

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Dept of the Army
Memo for: Deputy Asst Secty of Defense
From: Security Policy + Review Branch
Subj: Wer Bell, Mitchell Livingston III OSDNO. 69 59
dated 6 Oct 71

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 71-1618
11 NOV 1971

Mr. George MacClain
Director, Information
Security Division
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. MacClain:

Subject: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III
OSD No. 69-59

In accordance with your request of 13 October 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed the Official Report of Proceedings in the subject case. The Official Report of Proceedings does not contain any information pertaining to the CIA which should be classified.

It should be noted, however, that the lack of classification does not mean the CIA subscribes to or validates the testimony contained in the Official Report of Proceedings and this review should not be interpreted as an endorsement by this Agency of the statements contained therein.

Returned herewith is the Official Report of Proceedings.

Sincerely,

ERMAL P. GEISS

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

Enclosures
- Memo fr Examiner, ISCRD, 9/22/71
- ISCRD memo, 9/23/71
- ISD memo, 9/27/71
- Army response, 10/6/71
- Vol 1, OSD No. 69-59
- Vol 2, OSD No. 69-59

2.46 201-259910

14-00000

Office of the Ass't Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 13 Oct 71
Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III - OSD No. 69-59

14-00000

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division

Memo dated 22 Sep 71

Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 6959

14-00000

Office of Ass't. Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 23 Sep 71
Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 69-59

14-00000

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 27 Sep 71
Subj: Wes Bell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 69-59

14-00000

(When Filled In)

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File Werbell

C/FE 4 FILE, VR C/PLAN, DDP, ADDP, C/FE/VNO 4, C/FE/LOC 2

124 C/FI 2, C/CI, C/SAVA, D/SECUR 4, C/SOD 3 (13)

S E C R E T 121148Z NOV 71 CITE BANGKOK 24725 (SEGERQUIST ACTING)

DIRECTOR PHNOM PENH VIENTIANE SAIGON

RYBAT SECUR

REF: DIRECTOR 88114 (KNOTAL)

12 NOV IN 487962

1. MR. MITCHELL A. WERBELL, MILITARY ARMAMENT CORPORATION (FORMERLY AN ELEMENT OF WERBELL'S GEORGIA BASED FIRM OF SIONICS WHICH REPORTEDLY WENT BANKRUPT), IS BACK IN BANGKOK ATTEMPTING TO SELL HIS WARES (MACHINE PISTOLS AND SNIPER RIFLES). THE REF MESSAGE CITES THE FACT THAT HQS HAS A LENGTHY 201 ON SUBJECT (201-259910) AND THAT HE IS CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, A WHEELER-DEALER AND A PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE HAS ON OCCASION ALLUDED EITHER TO BEING AN LNLUTE REP OR HAVING LNLUTE BACKING.

2. SUBJECT MET WITH SEVERAL LNCUFF OFFICERS ON 5 NOV 71 AND RELATED THAT HE WAS ATTEMTING AGAIN TO INTEREST THE THAI GOVERNMENT IN PURCHASING HIS PRODUCTS. SUBJECT CLAIMS TO BE PERSONAL FRIEND OF AIR CHIEF MARSHAL DAWEE AND THAT HIS SAMPLE WEAPONS WERE CONSIGNED TO DAWEE IN ORDER TO BRING THEM INTO THAILAND. 3. SUBJECT ADVISED LNCUFF THAT GEN. KRIANGSAK HAD ORDERED

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ACTION UNIT FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE TWO BANGKOK 24725 S E C R E T

ONE HUNDRED MACHINE PISTOLS AND TWENTY SNIPER RIFLES. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAD MET WITH H.S.H. ADMIRAL DISKUL, CHIEF AIDE DE CAMP TO H.M. THE KING AND CLAIMS HE WILL SELL HIS MACHINE PISTOL TO THE ROYAL PALACE GUARDS. FURTHER CLAIMS HE WILL HAVE AUDIENCE THIS WEEK WITH H.M. THE KING.

4. FOLLOWING HIS CURRENT THAILAND VISIT, ON 16 NOV 71 SUBJECT AND MR. JASON M. STONE (201-296998) PLAN TRAVEL PHNOM PENH. PLAN TO CONTACT MR. LADD AT PHNOM PENH. ACCORDING LNCUFF SUBJECT PLANS CONTACT CAMBODIAN MIL. AUTHORITIES FOR POSSIBLE WEAPONS SALES. SUBJECT HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITEMS FOR GEN. POKSAMAN IN BANGKOK.

5. MR. JASON M. STONE IS HEAD OF BANGKOK BASED FIRM OF ASSOCIATED CONSULTANTS COMPANY LTD. HE IS CHINESE, WHO WORKED WITH WERBELL IN SEA DURING WWII. SUBJECT NOW REPRESENTS BELGIAN ARMS FIRMS AND IS REP FOR PILATUS PORTER AIRCRAFT.

6. FOLLOWING PHNOM PENH VISIT WERBELL PLANS TRAVEL TO LAOS IN A PILATUS PORTER, PROBABLY WITH STONE.

7. DUE RESTRICTION ON PASSING DEROG ON U.S. CITIZEN, BELIEVE BEST APPROACH TO FOLLOW IS CAREFUL ADVICE TO LOCAL

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(When Filled In)

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AGE THREE BANGKOK 24725 S E C R E T

IAISON THAT SUBJECT HAS NO OFFICIAL LNLUTE RELATION

ND CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN ANY BUSINESS DEAL. GP-1

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* C/S APPARENTLY WRONG REF.

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14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 71-1570

REGISTERED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

28 October 1971

Mr. David H. Henretta, Jr.
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division
Suite 602, Lynn Building
1111 North 19th Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Henretta:

I am returning herewith the Interrogatories sent with your letter of October 26, 1971 and which I have executed before a Notary Public as requested.

Since the xerox copy of Mr. Joseph Liebling's letter did not contain some of the formalities that were in the original, I have noted this in my answer to Interrogatory III.

I trust this takes care of what you need.

Very truly yours,

s/ Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

Encl. - Interrogatories

2.22

INTERROGATORIES

Section 1001, Title 18, United States Code. Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any Department or Agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

I.

Please state your name, address and professional position and indicate how long you have served in this position.

ANSWER: Lawrence R. Houston, Esquire
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
General Counsel
Twenty-four years

II.

In your official capacity as General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, did you receive a letter dated February 16, 1971 from Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense?

ANSWER: Yes

III.

Attached to these interrogatories is a three page document marked "Gov. Ex 14". Are pages 2 and 3 a xerox copy of the letter referred to in Question II?

ANSWER: Yes. The xerox copy does not have handwritten salutation, signature or printed letterhead; however, the text of the original and the xerox copy have been compared and found to be identical.

IV.

If the Answer to III. is in the affirmative did you subsequently respond to this letter?

ANSWER: Yes

V.

If affirmative, is page one of the attachment, "Gov. Ex 14", a xerox copy of your responding letter to Mr. Liebling?

ANSWER: Yes

VI.

If affirmative, is the information in the letter dated 23 February 1971 (in answer to the questions posed in the letter dated 16 February 1971) true and correct to your best knowledge and belief?

ANSWER: Yes

The foregoing answers to the Interrogatories made by me are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston

Subscribed and Sworn to before me a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ___ day of ___ 1971.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires May 12, 1973

2.42

14-00000

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division

Letter dated 26 Oct 71

Re: WerBell, Mitchell L. III, Docket No. 228

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III (MIM-056-71)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Deputy Director, DCS 912 Key Bldg.	2265	OGC 71-6387 DATE 15 March 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. John K. Greaney, OGC 7D01 HQ				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

MIM-056-71

Director, Domestic Contact Service — 10 March 1971

ATTN : John McConnell
John Greany (OGC)
Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of scrapes, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Greany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.

4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OGC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/css

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Gun Shipment Figures Played Dramatic Roles

By Bruce Galphin
Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA, Dec. 2—The two top officials of an Atlanta firm under investigation for receiving guns shipped from Vietnam through Eglin Air Force Base in Florida are no strangers to controversy or dramatic situations.

One was actively involved in plans to set up an anti-Castro base in Haiti, and both were in the Dominican Republic during the 1965 American intervention to put down a revolution.

Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, vice president of Sionics, an Atlanta weapons research and manufacturing firm, was indicted 2½ years ago on charges of violating a federal law forbidding preparation of a military expedition against a friendly nation from American territory.

The indictment against WerBell and six others was made after customs agents raided an island camp near Marathon, Fla., where they seized a small arsenal of weapons and found 75 battle-clad exiles and Americans.

Not on Island

WerBell himself was not on the island at the time of the raid.

Only four weeks after WerBell was accused, the U.S. attorney in Miami announced the charge was being dismissed "on the authority of the attorney general" (Ramsey Clark). The federal attorney, William A. Meadows Jr., said he could not make any further comment on why the charge was being dropped.

WerBell commented wryly that he was unhappy because "I've lost my one claim to notoriety."

At the time of the indictment, WerBell was quoted by the Atlanta Constitution as admitting an "extremely combatant role" in the anti-Castro base plans.

The federal indictment had alleged a conspiracy to ship guns and munitions from Atlanta and New York to Miami.

But WerBell told a reporter at the time of the indictment that he had withdrawn his support from the Haitian base plan when it appeared to be headed toward direct military action.

"If I'm called upon again to fight Communists in the western hemisphere, I'll do it," he said. "Anything I've done has served the best interest of the United States."

"I've been involved in anti-communist activities a long time," he said. "I've helped the Dominican government fight the Communists."

Aided Newsman

In the Dominican action two years before, WerBell was credited with pulling a wounded American newsman out of a bullet-riddled car in Santo Domingo. The newsman, Miami Herald photographer Doug Kennedy, had been accidentally wounded by U.S. Marine gunfire.

Fred N. Brown, president of Sionics, also was in the Dominican capital at the time as an official for an American development corporation.

At one point during the fighting, he said a few days afterward, he and some 200 other Americans were "lined up against a wall" by armed revolutionaries at a Santo Domingo hotel.

He said the rebels were looking for Cuban nationalists, and that he managed to slip inside the hotel, where American embassy officials negotiated safe conduct. He was evacuated by helicopter to a U.S. warship.

"The Communist movement has actually defeated itself" by forcing the United States "to adopt such a firm policy," he commented at the time.

Both the Dominican fighting and the Marathon raid occurred before WerBell and Brown founded Sionics.

An Air Force officer at Eglin is under investigation for his role in three shipments of small arms from Vietnam. WerBell denied reports that the weapons were intended for right-wing anti-Negro groups and said he himself, while in Vietnam had had the captured weapons sent to Atlanta via Eglin for laboratory research.

1969

2.31

201-259910

14-00000

Viet Arms Shipment to Fla. Aired

By Bruce Galphin
Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA, Dec. 1 — An Atlanta weapons manufacturer said today that he and not an Air Force officer was responsible for three now-controversial shipments of small arms from Vietnam to Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

And, said the businessman, Mitchell L. Werbell III, "We were trying to do a favor for everybody.

"It's a shame they have taken a nice officer like (Lt. Col.) Paul Marriott and made a scapegoat of him. Marriott didn't even know about it."

Marriott, chief assistant of the Eglin Armament Laboratory, is under investigation for his role in the gun shipments. The Air Force has not yet released a report on findings of its investigation.

Werbell is vice president of Sionics, an Atlanta weapons research and manufacturing company.

He said he spent time in Vietnam supervising the testing of flash and sound suppressors manufactured by his firm. While he was there, he said, various South Vietnamese organizations and military officials gave him guns.

Werbell said he was interested in testing the Sionics suppressors on captured Russian-designed AK-47 machine guns, and that he sent a crate back to the states via Eglin. They were officially registered, were delivered to Atlanta and are now "in various stages of disassembly in our laboratory," he stated.

Washington Post - 2 December 1969

2.3b

201-259910

14-00000

Memo from OGC
23 Feb 71
OGC-71-0248
Request concerning affiliation of WerBell + C.I.A.
(answered "NO")

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Hon. Joseph J. Liebling

Joe: You may already know it, but if you do not, WerBell's lawyer, Edwin Marger, has taken this line before. He was counsel for a British pilot, Hawke, who was tried in Buffalo in 1966 for flying B-26s to Portugal without export licenses. Marger developed the theory that these flights had CIA approval and support. This was totally untrue as we testified at the trial, but Marger seemed convinced that he had a case. He seems to be easily convinced by his clients.

Let me know if you want anything more.

s/Larry

23 February 1971

(DATE)

2.23

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

14-00000

OGC 71-0248

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 February 1971

The Honorable Joseph J. Liebling
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Security Policy)
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Liebling:

Re: WerBell, Mitchell L., III

In response to your letter of 16 February 1971 concerning Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III's alleged affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency, we have investigated the matter thoroughly, and based on all the information available, the answer is "No" for each of your questions numbered 1 through 6.

You should be advised that Mr. WerBell voluntarily contacted a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency's Domestic Contact Service in Coral Gables, Florida, and at Mr. WerBell's initiation furnished voluntary information for the period 16 December 1965 - 19 November 1966 with eleven contacts. It should be noted that the function of the Domestic Contact Service is to receive information which individuals feel is of interest to the United States Government. The office is overtly listed in the telephone book under the Central Intelligence Agency and, therefore, is readily available for contact.

If Mr. WerBell suggests an affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency, he is hereby authorized to divulge the details of his alleged affiliation in the hearing so that he may not use ostensible security as a means of avoiding answering questions.

Sincerely,

Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

201-259910

14-00000

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense

Letter dated 16 Feb 71

Re: Werbell application for an industrial security clearance.

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
REGISTRATION REQUEST

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
FI/DCG/INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER 2 E 03	5045	ISRM 36075
		DATE ~~22 MAR 1972~~ 22 MAR 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/201 Section GA 20		22 Mar		
2.				
3. IP/~~[illegible]~~ FD/ GB 34				5 - 3: PLEASE RUSH ABSTRACTING
4.				
5. FI/ISR 2 E 03				201-259910
6.				ABSTRACT X INDEX
7.				DATE ~~21 MAR 1972~~ 22 MAR 1972
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				233

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

No Record in FR/Index. 23 March 1972

25-9910

~~201-~~

SIGNATURE	DIVISION	DATE
Loretta Keighly	FR/21	23 March 1972

UTILIZATION	RE-CHECK
DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE	
TO: DCS	TO: SECURITY
TO: DO	TO: CCS
ISSM NO.	201 NO.

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (20-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

I S R LOG

ADDRESSEE REMARKS

NATIONAL FILE NO.	DATE
NEW	RE-REGISTRATION
UTILIZATION	RE-CHECK
DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE	
TO: DCS	TO: SECURITY DC No Record 3/24
TO: DO	TO: CCS
ISSM NO.	201 NO.

SIGNATURE | DIVISION | DATE

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET 2.33 [signature] (20-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

I S R LOG

ADDRESSEE REMARKS

No Objection to Registration. DCS reserves the right to contact subject in accordance with its responsibilities under NSCID 2, DCID 2/3 and 2/3; but will waive this right by mutual agreement if his intended use so requires.

NATIONAL FILE NO.	DATE
NEW	RE-REGISTRATION
UTILIZATION	RE-CHECK
DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE	
TO: DCS	TO: SECURITY
TO: DO	TO: CCS
ISSM NO.	201 NO.

SIGNATURE: ~~DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE~~ Operational Support Staff, 900 Key | DIVISION | DATE: 22 Mar 72

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET 2.33 (20-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

I S R LOG

ADDRESSEE REMARKS

no CCS objection
23 Mar 72
Jo Albright
for Chief/CCS/CCB

NATIONAL FILE NO.	DATE
NEW	RE-REGISTRATION
UTILIZATION	RE-CHECK
DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE	
TO: DCS	TO: SECURITY
TO: DO	TO: CCS
ISSM NO.	201 NO.

SIGNATURE | DIVISION | DATE

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET 2.33 (20-38)

DW-7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CS COPY

CHECK ONE

Aldes /ISR -03 Ext. 5345	REQUEST FOR [X] REGISTRATION [ ] DE-REGISTRATION	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
DEADLINE: 1400 HRS., 24 MARCH 1972		ISRN NO. 36,075
		DATE 22 MARCH 1972
X NEW	RE-REGISTRATION / X UTILIZATION / RE-CHECK	201 NO. 259910

NAME (Last, First, Middle)
W E R B E L L, Mitchell Livingston, III

US

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS
WER-BELL

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
CA 1918	Pennsylvania	USA

RESIDENCE
Highway 360, Powder Springs, Cobb County, Georgia

PRESENT EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION
Defense Systems, Inc., Powder Springs, Georgia	President

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA
Past Emp: Rich's Dept. Store, Atlanta
Former OSS Officer in CBI Theater, WW II

TRACE RESULTS

RID/INDEX REMARKS
NR 3-23-72 JRS

RID/CE REMARKS

RESULTS

TO: S & DR	DATE 24 March 72	NATIONAL FILE NO. 238852 Army

1. The ISR has no record of a current operational interest in Subject. This is not a registration.

NOTE: This request for registration in the ISR was changed to a utilization check at the request of Mrs. Goodall, USAFAC, 24 March 1972.

EVB

23 MAR 1972

DROP DATE	REASON DROPPED

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SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

IW CW

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E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 007622

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT
WH 11

INFO: FILE, VR, ADDO, DDO/DO, IP/AN, IW, FI 5, DDO, SA 4, CI, CI/PS, CI/OPS, SOD 3.

ACTION #
498

T 330389 PAGE 01 IN 953234

TOR:201526Z JUN 73 WHIM 18806

S E C R E T 201451Z JUN 73 INTEL

TDFIR-314/05249-73
UFP-921

CITE WH/MIAMI 18806

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL VWVAPOR

SUPDATA VWAGALLEY/VWKNOB-1 IN MEETING IN NASSAU 15 JUNE 73.
VWKNOB-1 AND VWKNOB-2 INDEPENDENTLY SAID REAL TROUBLE MAKERS RE ABACO WERE U.S. MUNITIONS DEALERS ASSOCIATED WITH MITCHELL W A R B E L L IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA. CLASSIFIED BY TURNER D. SAUNORAS. INDEX WATKINS. FILE: 189-9-1. UFP-921.

FILED 201451Z

S E C R E T

2.56 201-259910 201 Werbell

● ROUTINE

IN 953234

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA XXXX SDO ONE CRS

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR -314/05249-73

DIST 20 JUNE 1973

COUNTRY BAHAMA ISLANDS

DOI 15 JUNE 1973

SUBJECT ANTICIPATION THAT ABACO SECESSIONISTS WILL NOT RESORT TO VIOLENCE

ACQ 16 JUNE 1973

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BAHAMIAN SERVICE.

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ANY VIOLENCE AND/OR ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE ABACO SECESSIONISTS DURING THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS. TROUBLE IS NOT EXPECTED FROM THE COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO AND ERRINGTON W A T K I N S, LEADING SPOKESMAN FOR THE ABACO SECESSIONISTS AND FORMER FREE NATIONAL MOVEMENT (FNM) MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. TROUBLE MAY, HOWEVER, OCCUR AFTER INDEPENDENCE.

2. WATKINS IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN ERRATIC PERSONALITY WHO COULD TAKE EXTREME ACTION IF ABACO WERE IGNORED BY THE GOVERNMENT AFTER INDEPENDENCE OR NOT GIVEN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

S E C R E T

254

FORM 4-73 3007 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 953234

TDFIR-314 05249-73

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

IN THE MEANTIME, WATKINS VALUES HIS POLITICAL CAREER AND WISHES TO REGAIN HIS PARLIAMENTARY SEAT. HE, THEREFORE, IS NOT LIKELY TO ATTEMPT ANY VIOLENT ACTION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE BAHAMAS PRESS REPORTED ON 13 JUNE 1973 THAT WATKINS HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM THE FNM. ON 15 JUNE THE BAHAMAS PRESS REPORTED THAT WATKINS HAD DECLARED HIMSELF AN INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATIVE IN PARLIAMENT AND THAT THE COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO WOULD BE CONVERTED INTO A POLITICAL PARTY.)

3. (BAHAMIAN SERVICE COMMENT: IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT WATKINS' NEW POLITICAL PARTY WILL BECOME A SIGNIFICANT FORCE IN THE BAHAMAS. A FEW OTHER FNM MEMBERS, INCLUDING POSSIBLY SIR ROLAND S Y M O N E T T E, CLEOPHAS A D D E R L E Y AND MICHAEL L I G H T B O U R N, MAY JOIN THE NEW PARTY, ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE ALSO EXPELLED FROM THE FNM. IN THE FUTURE, A THREE PARTY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE THE PROGRESSIVE LIBERAL PARTY, THE OPPOSITION FNM AND THE NEW WATKINS PARTY MAY EMERGE IN THE BAHAMAS.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1), (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

S E C R E T

14-00000

Trace Request from AF OSI
Case # 04D74 (24C) 3232
[illegible]
Dated 8 May 70

FBI document dated 5 May 70
From Atlanta, Ga.
Subject: Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, III
Sionics Lab
Route I, Powder Springs,
Georgia

FBI document
dated 13 Mar '70
Bureau file: (NI) 62-108665
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III - Neutrality Matters

26 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Washington Evening Star Article entitled "The Story of CBS and the Plot to Invade Haiti" which appeared in the 26 February 1970 Edition

1. Subject article reported that a CBS cameraman, James WILSON, had contacted CIA agents in Houston while on a space shot assignment in 1966, and that the CIA had informed the FBI, who called on WILSON and referred him to U.S. Customs.

2. WH Division has ascertained that on 30 June 1966, a James WILSON called the CIA Duty Officer of the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) office in Houston, Texas, and subsequently related a story about a proposed plot being staged in the U.S. to invade Haiti and overthrow the Duvalier Government, and that CBS had convinced the parties involved that they should allow CBS to photograph and televise a Special Program on the preparations. WILSON requested and received assurances from the DCS officer that he would not be identified as the source of this information.

3. On 6 July 1966, WH Division sent a blind memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of State which forwarded a resume of WILSON's story to the DCS, without identifying the source. The memorandum stated that the source's motive for disclosing this information was to alert the U.S. Government to a potentially embarrassing situation if it were involved in an insecure operation. The JMWAVE Station also passed a resume of this information to the U.S. Customs Bureau in Miami.

4. Except in connection with this report, there is no record of any operational involvement by the Agency with WILSON.

201-259916

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, SOD/GB

SUBJECT : Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, dated 30 January 1970

1. WH/7 conveyed the substance of your first memorandum on this subject to the FBI, which has now advised us that the Office of Special Investigations, USAF, and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department, have both had recent investigative interest in WERBELL's activities.

2. Under these circumstances, WH/7 suggests that LTC Cochrane be advised to inform an appropriate USAF security office of Mr. WERBELL's statements. This should insure that any follow-up inquiry concerning those statements would be properly coordinated with such other investigations as may be in process.

David L. Smock
C/WH/7

201-259910

SOD ?.-.13?.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/7

SUBJECT: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

REFERENCE: Memorandum for C/WH/7, Same Subject, dated 15 January 1970

1. On 28 January 1970, Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, Vice President of SIONICS, Inc., told LTC Barney Cochrane, USAF, that he had not been contacted by any interested representative of the U.S. Government concerning the information pertaining to Haitian plotting passed previously. Mr. WerBell said that his reference to the plan being initiated in Canada is a blind and that the plotting is based in Haiti. He also stated that he has been approached to provide the equivalent of five million dollars worth of arms to the group and that the plotting has French backing.

2. The above information was received from LTC Cochrane by LTC Charles Williamson, USMC, and is provided to WH/7 for disposition and action. This information, to the best of our knowledge, has not been acted upon by SACSA; however, Mr. WerBell is concerned that no action is being taken or apparent interest shown.

Casimiro Barquin
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

2.26

14-00000

20 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III

REFERENCE : Memo from C/SOD/GB to C/WH/7 dtd 15 Jan 1970
Subject: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

1. Andrew Bacuzzi, SOD/GB, advised 19 January 1969, after my phone call to Mr. Barquin pointing out the third Agency aspect of the Werbell report, that Col. Williamson has checked with his friend Col. Cochrane, and that the latter stated he had taken no other action with this info and intended to take none. Col. Cochrane apparently regards the info as being none of his own official business and was telling his friend (Williamson) about it as a private citizen.

2. Suggest we just use Williamson as the source.

James P. Mullen
C/WH/7/HT

Distribution:
1 - 201-259910
1 - 100-9-16
1 - WH/7/HT Chrono

2.25

201-259910

14-00000

SOD 70-057

15 JAN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/7

SUBJECT: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

1. The Vice President of SIONICS Inc., Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, contacted LTC Barney Cochrane, USAF, assigned to SACSA, in early January 1970 and said that he learned of the existence of plans for a special clandestine operation based perhaps in Canada against President Duvalier's regime within the next four months. Mr. WerBell said that he believes this effort has a good chance of success since it is well financed and directed. Mr. WerBell conveyed to LTC Cochrane that he is willing to reveal all that he knows concerning the organization and its plan to interested U.S. authorities.

2. The above information was obtained from LTC Cochrane by LTC Charles Williamson, USMC, assigned to SOD/GB. SOD and the Office of Security have an extensive file on Mr. WerBell who has a long history of worldwide involvement in borderline and sometimes illegal international gun deals. It is felt by LTC Cochrane that Mr. WerBell's story is plausible and warrants further investigation. Mr. WerBell's motive for revealing this type of information at present could be an effort to relieve pressure on his firm and himself for gun deals that did not conform to U.S. export control regulations and are being investigated and warrants pending.

3. To the best of our knowledge, no action has been taken on this information by SACSA.

Casimiro Barquin
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

2.34

14-00000

Cable from FBI dated 22 Jan 70

Subj: Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, Internal Security - Haiti

14-00000

MSG: R. LEHMAN:gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-5595
DATE: 19 JAN 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

[ ] INDEX [ ] NO INDEX [ ] RETURN TO ______ BRANCH [ ] FILE RID

[X] FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-259910

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 003879

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 19 JAN 1970

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI

MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO THIS AGENCY'S CSCI 316/02323-69 DATED 27 JUNE 1969; SUBJECT: WERBELL, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON III, A COPY OF WHICH WAS SENT TO YOUR BUREAU.

2. IN EARLY JANUARY 1970, A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING SUBJECT. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, WERBELL HAS STATED THAT HE KNOWS OF PLANS FOR A SPECIAL CLANDESTINE OPERATION AGAINST PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S REGIME IN HAITI SCHEDULED TO OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS. WERBELL SAID THE OPERATION, WHICH MIGHT BE BASED IN CANADA, IS WELL FINANCED AND DIRECTED AND, IN HIS ESTIMATION, HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. SOURCE SAID WERBELL EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO REVEAL ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO INTERESTED U.S. AUTHORITIES CONCERNING THE PLANS AND THE ORGANIZATION BEHIND THE CLANDESTINE OPERATION.

Continued. . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

2, 22

14-00000

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TOTAL COPIES:

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INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO ______ BRANCH / FILE RID

FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF:

INFO

FILE, VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 003879

SOURCE COMMENTED THAT WERBELL'S MOTIVE FOR REVEALING THIS INFORMATION TO U.S. AUTHORITIES AT THIS TIME MAY BE THE HOPE OF RELIEVING PRESSURE ON HIS FIRM AND HIMSELF FOR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BELIEVED TO BE PRESENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS.

3. THE FILES OF THIS AGENCY REFLECT THAT WERBELL IS VICE PRESIDENT OF SIONICS, INC., OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA, AND THAT HE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS BY YOUR BUREAU IN CONNECTION WITH HIS NUMEROUS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS AGENCY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION WHICH YOUR BUREAU CAN OBTAIN CONCERNING THE ALLEGED OPERATION REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: Memo for C/WH/7 from C/SOD/CB
Subject: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti
Dated : 15 January 1970

C/WH/R ______

SOD/GB

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/CI/LIAISON

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 COPY NO.

201-259910

SECRET

27 JUN 1969

TO: Chief, Counterintelligence Division
Directorate of Special Investigations
The Inspector General, USAF

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III

1. Reference is made to your request dated 28 May 1969 concerning Subject, born 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The files of this office contain the following information.

2. According to a summary report dated 19 March 1969, compiled from numerous documents, Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 when it was discovered that he was involved with anti-CASTRO plotters in the Dominican Republic. Further investigation disclosed Subject to be unscrupulous--a wheeler-dealer and promoter of grandiose schemes, with a history of materializing in areas and situations where he can make a quick profit. The report also revealed that Subject, in his foreign dealings, had misrepresented himself as an employee of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. In March 1969 Subject was in Thailand conducting or attempting to conduct business with the Royal Thai Government.

CSCI-316/02323-69

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Department of State

CC: Defense Intelligence Agency

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

RID/CE: JKS/MB/nkc
BASED ON: DIR-88114, 19 March 1969 (to Bangkok)
FILE IN: 201-259910*

201-259910

SECRET

14-00000

Trace Request from AF, Counterintelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations

File No. 04D 74 (24c) 3232 dated 28 May 69

S E C R E T - TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - FTBA-33,068

DATE - 30 JUNE 1969

FILM - NONE

INDEX - NONE

FILE - NONE

TO - CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, BANGKOK

SUBJECT - SIONICS INC. PROPOSAL TO RTG FOR SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM

ACTION - NONE

REF - FTBW-16321

1. STATION HAD SEEN PUBLICATION CITED PARA ONE OF REF.

2. WERBELL FIRST CAME TO ATTENTION OF STATION IN LATE MARCH 1969, WHEN HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH BPP IN BANGKOK. AFTER RECEIVING DIR 88114 IN RESPONSE TO OUR TRACE REQUEST, WE SUGGESTED TO BPP THAT THEY WOULD DO WELL TO AVOID HIM. WE HEARD NOTHING OF HIM FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. HOWEVER, IN LATE APRIL AND EARLY MAY HE WAS BACK IN THE SPOTLIGHT AND, WE DISCOVERED, IN TOUCH WITH A VARIETY OF RTG AND U.S. MILITARY ELEMENTS. WE PROMPTLY PASSED THE GIST OF HIS REPUTATION TO KEY PERSONALITIES IN THE MISSION INCLUDING AMBASSADOR, DEFENSE ATTACHE, ARPA, SA/CI, U.S. ARMY CIC, OSI AND J-2 MACTHAI. WE PARTICULARLY STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SPONSORED IN ANY WAY BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HIS NAME HAS COME UP CONSISTENTLY FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND WE HAVE PULLED VERY FEW PUNCHES IN DESCRIBING HIM, EITHER TO AMERICANS OR THAIS. IN FACT, WE WROTE A MEMORANDUM EXPRESSING OUR RESERVATIONS, PASSED IT TO J-2 MACTHAI, AND SUGGESTED HE BRIEF THE J-2 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ACCORDINGLY. WE ALSO SENT A BURN NOTICE MESSAGE, BANGKOK 3055, TO ALL FE STATIONS.

3. AFTER DYNAMIC BEGINNING, WERBELL IS NOW SUFFERING EXPECTED

DEFERRED

CS COPY

201-259910

SETBACKS. THE EMBASSY HAS REFUSED TO ENDORSE HIM AND HIS PRODUCTS. MACTHAI HAS AGREED TO FURNISH TO RTG SOME OF THE ITEMS HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO PEDDLE, AND RTG HAS COOLED CONSIDERABLY RE SIONICS PARTICIPATION IN ANY ASPECT OF COUNTER INSURGENCY EFFORT. WERBELL'S RUNNING MATE, M/GEN WATSON, HAS ALREADY LEFT THAILAND. WERBELL IS SUPPOSED TO LEAVE SHORTLY. WE WILL MISS HIM. I'll bet!

EDGAR N. DANAGE

DISTRIBUTION VIA TELEPOUCH

2 - CHIEF, FE DIVISION

2.19

14-00000

State Dept. Telegram
BANGKOK 8458 dated 25 June '69
Subject: Export License for
Ingram Submachine Gun

SECRET/RYBAT/ TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - FTB[illegible]-16301

FILE NO - 201-259910

DATE - 23 JUNE 1968

INDEX - NONE

FILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, BANGKOK

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

SUBJECT - SIONICS, INC. PROPOSAL TO RTG FOR SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM

ACTION - NONE

REFS - A. DIRECTOR 08114

B. DIRECTOR 9[illegible]

C. BANGKOK 3095 (IN 66602)

1. POUCHING PRIORITY UNDER TM 403749 COPY OF SIONICS PROPOSAL ''NEUTRALIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST TERRORIST THREAT IN THAILAND'' OBTAINED LOCALLY FROM LNREAD WHICH STATION MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE SEEN.

2. PROPOSAL ESSENTIALLY HAS CIVILIAN FIRM INSERTING ITSELF INTO MILITARY ADVISORY ROLE WITH OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF PEDDLING ITS HARDWARE AT SUBSTANTIAL PROFIT YET COVERING ITSELF WITH SEMI-OFFICIAL AURA. IF THAIS FALL FOR APPROACH OF THIS SORT, THEY WILL EVENTUALLY REALIZE THEY HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THIS COULD HAVE FAIRLY SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON THAI-US RELATIONS. WE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED SINCE PER REF C WERBELL HAS PENCHANT FOR REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS RETIRED COLONEL AND AS LOCAL CHIEF OF WOFIRM. FYI, WE UNDERSTAND SOME HARDWARE ITEMS IN PROPOSAL ARE QUITE GOOD BUT NOTE THAT SUCH ITEMS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH REGULAR MAP CHANNELS AT LOWER COST.

CS COPY

201-259910

2-7

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH FTBW-16301 PAGE TWO

3. REALIZE THAT STATION IS NOT IN POSITION TO EXERT VETO OVER SIGWILG PROPOSAL BUT FEEL IT INCUMBENT UPON WOFIRM TO APPRISE SA/CI, MACTHAI, AMBASSADOR AND ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES ON WERBELL'S BACKGROUND AND OUR VERY STRONG RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THIS PROPOSAL TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY ''TO THE DEFEAT OF COMMUNIST TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION IN THAILAND'' AS ADVERTISED, AND EVEN STRONGER RESERVATIONS RE ANY OFFICIAL INVEOLVEMENT WITH WERBELL.

4. FURTHER CHECK OF 201 FILE INDICATES SUBJECT REFS ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE IN APRIL 1943, WAS COMMISSIONED 2ND LIEUTENANT IN SIGNAL CORPS JUNE 1944 AND ASSIGNED TO CHINA-BURMA THEATER. SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO OSS FROM APRIL UNTIL DECEMBER 1945 WHEN HE RETURNED TO VOLADY AND WAS DISCHARGED AS 1ST LIEUTENANT. IN ADDITION TO FOUR CAMPAIGN MEDALS, SUBJECT WAS AWARDED SOLDIERS MEDAL FOR PERSONAL HEROISM EXHIBITED IN SAVING THE LIFE OF CHINESE SOLDIER WHO FELL INTO ELECTRICAL TRANSFORMER. RECORD INDICATES NO FURTHER MILITARY SERVICE.

JOHN K. [illegible]ARINE

ATTACHMENT, U/S/C

AS STATED ABOVE

DISTRIBUTION: / VIA TELEPOUCH/

2 - COS, BANGKOK

Headquarters:
1 - FE/TBL/T
1 - RI/SD
1 - CI/OPS/FE
1 - SOD/GB/MS

FE/TBL/T/RGWeidner/SOD/GB/MS/
CTWilliamson:dsr/1742

FE/TBL

CI/OPS/FE W.Johnson (In Draft)

ACFE/TBL Robert D. Kennedy

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH FTBW-16301 PAGE TWO END

CFE William E. Nelson

2.17

23 June 1969

201-259910

CS COPY

14-00000

Dept of State Telegram
STATE 101507 dated 20 JUNE '69
Subject: Export License for
Ingram Submachine Gun

14-00000

State Dept. Telegram

BANGKOK 8235 dated 20 June '69

(re: import license)

14-00000

State Dept. Telegram
STATE 087398 dated 29 May 69
Subject: Starlight Scopes and Silencers

14-00000

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ACTION C/FE 4 RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR. C/CI/SP C/CA C/FE/VNO4

860 C/FE/CO4 C/CON 3 C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

S E C R E T 261218Z MAY 69 CITE BANGKOK 3055

26 MAY 69 IN 66602

SAIGON INFO: DIRECTOR, VIENTIANE, SINGAPORE, MANILA, RANGOON, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, DJAKARTA, TOKYO, SEOUL, KUALA LUMPUR

REF: DIRECTOR 88114 (SENT BANGKOK ONLY)

1. WE HAVE BEEN PLAGUED FOR SOME WEEKS NOW BY MR. MITCHELL L. WERBELL III, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF R AND D OF SIONICS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA. WERBELL DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS A COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERT, HAS A VARIETY OF WEAPONS TO DISPLAY, CLAIMS TO BE A RETIRED COLONEL, AND LAST WEEK INTRODUCED HIMSELF AT A LOCAL NIGHTCLUB AS CHIEF OF WOFIRM IN THAILAND.

FE/ESEC

ABSTRACT X

2. WERBELL HAS A HISTORY OF SHOWING UP IN TROUBLE SPOTS WHERE HE CAN MAKE A FAST BUCK. HE IMPLIES THAT HE IS U.S. GOVT CONNECTED AND PRESENTS A DEMONSTRATION OF A VARIETY OF EXOTIC WEAPONS THAT NEVER FAILS TO IMPRESS. REF DESCRIBES HIM AS AN UNSCRUPULOUS OPPORTUNIST WITH A REPUTATION FOR LIVING BEYOND HIS MEANS.

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26 May 69

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PAGE 2 BANGKOK 3055 S E C R E T

3. WERBELL IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, BORN 1919, SERVED IN OSS, HAS SHAVEN HEAD AND HANDLEBAR MUSTACHE. REF ADVISES THAT FULL DETAILS OF HIS BACKGROUND SHOULD NOT BE PASSED TO LIAISON SINCE HE IS U.S. CITIZEN. HOWEVER, STATES THAT LIAISON CAN BE INFORMED, SHOULD HE APPEAR IN YOUR AREA, THAT HE HAS AN UNSAVORY REPUTATION, HAS NO U.S. GOVT CONNECTIONS, AND ANY DEALINGS WITH HIM SHOULD BE APPROACHED WITH EXTREME CAUTION.

4. FOR SAIGON: WE UNDERSTAND THAT WERBELL RECENTLY VISITED SAIGON AND DID HIS THING WITH GEN. ABRAMS, WHO WAS SUITABLY IMPRESSED, AND WERBELL IS NOW SETTING UP A SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM.

5. FILE: 201-259910

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SIONICS

[illegible] PEACHTREE STREET N.E., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30309 (404) 873-3072

26 May 1969

Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya
Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Supreme Command, RTAF
Bangkok, Thailand

Dear Air Chief Marshal Dawee:

Sionics, Inc. is pleased to submit this proposal in response to the urgent requirement to neutralize the communist terrorist threat in the border areas of Thailand. This requirement was first brought to our attention during the recent trip to threatened border areas of Thailand made by yourself, Air Vice Marshal Manob, and Major General Prasart, accompanied by our field representative to Thailand, Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III.

This urgent requirement was of course further discussed with you during your recent visit to Washington to attend the funeral of General Eisenhower.

In consequence we have prepared a pilot program with the objective of neutralizing the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand. We have entitled the program "Neutralization of the Communist Terrorist Threat in Thailand" with short title NCTTT. In scope the NCTTT encompasses five major phases and spans a twelve month program. Basically we offer a proven program based, in part, on the outstandingly successful U. S. 9th Division Sniper Program in the Delta of Vietnam. Finally, and most importantly, this program is also based on Special Operations programs executed by members of the Sionics organization during wartime, counterinsurgency and guerrilla operations executed in South Asia, Europe, South America, Dominican Republic, and Vietnam.

We have selected a team of highly qualified experts whose combined capabilities represent all the disciplines required to the planning and execution of this program.

In view of the above, Sionics, Inc. assures you that the full resources of the Corporation will be provided for the successful performance of this work. We look forward to the opportunity of serving the Royal Thai Government in order to contribute to the defeat of Communist terrorism and subversion in Thailand.

With Warm Personal Regard and Respect.

Sincerely,

Sionics, Inc.

Fred N. Brown
President

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[illegible]

FOR THE

NEUTRALIZATION OF THE

COMMUNIST/TERRORIST THREAT

IN THAILAND

VOLUME I: OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL

[illegible] May, 196[illegible]

Prepared for: Air Chief Marshal [illegible] Chullasap[illegible]

Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Supreme Command, [illegible]

Bangkok, Thailand

Prepared by: [illegible]IONICS, INC.

Atlanta, Georgia

PROPRIETARY NOTICE

The data furnished herein--

shall not be disclosed outside the Royal Thai Government or the United States Government or be duplicated, used or disclosed in whole or in part for any purpose other than to evaluate this proposal, provided that if a contract is awarded to this offeror as a result of or in connection with the submission of such data, these Governments shall have the right to duplicate, use, or disclose this data to the extent provided in the contract. This restriction does not limit these Governments' right to use information contained in such data if it is obtained from another source.

S I O N I C S, I N C.
Atlanta, Georgia

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[illegible]

[illegible] FIGURES

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[illegible] INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This proposal is presented by SIONICS, Inc. in response to urgent requirements to neutralize the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand as voiced by responsible members of the Royal Government of Thailand.

We have examined the problem in detail and have concluded that the unique capabilities of SIONICS, Inc. can provide one answer to stopping Communist terrorism in Thailand. We have either worked on, are working on, or will soon become involved in projects of this type, which will insure immediate working knowledge of the essential elements for problem solution.

We have established firm liaison with the Royal Thai Government and U. S. Government organizations in Thailand to include Supreme Command Headquarters, [illegible], U. S. Embassy, USOM, [illegible], JUSMAG, MACTHAI, MACV. Additionally, SIONICS has established wide and successful relationships with U. S. Government and industrial organizations concerned with the problem.

In consequence, it is considered that SIONICS, Inc. would be fully capable of executing the program proposed and of expanding it to help solve the final problem of arresting Communist subversion in Thailand. It is our opinion that the methodology format, and related matters are well described in this proposal. Our task will be to field a team of professional and highly qualified military technicians, backed by appropriate support and resources, that will be fully capable of executing this plan to the complete satisfaction of the Royal Thai Government. To

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this and we have personnel immediately available that represent a solid blend of counter-insurgency operational experience and technical knowledge.

In view of the nature of the problem, this proposal is basically an outline plan indicating how the operation will be accomplished. This volume presents our operational proposal, along with a proposed management plan, a summary of corporate experience, and the resumes of the military and technical personnel SIGNICS, Inc. proposes to assign to the effort. The Cost Proposal is submitted separately as VOLUME II.

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I. [illegible]

[illegible] which will contribute to the neutralization [illegible] the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand.

II. [illegible] DISCUSSION

A. Fundamental Requirements for Problem Solution

[illegible], Inc. consider that the basic success of this plan will depend in large measure of fielding a team of knowledgeable individuals who:

1. Know Thailand and the considerable Communist threat to its border areas,

2. Know the principal personalities in the Royal Thai Government (RTG) concerned with neutralizing the Communist threat,

3. Know the principal U. S. Government officials in Thailand, South Vietnam, and Washington, D. C. concerned with assisting the RTG in neutralizing this threat,

4. Fully understand the threat of Communist terrorism and subversion and possess the knowledge and skill to counteract this threat,

5. Know and be able to apply firsthand the tactics, techniques, organizational and training procedures, and weapons and equipment techniques/employment to defeat this threat, and

6. Possess long experience and proven skills in defeating an insurgent threat.

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B. Systematic Introduction of Military Judgement

By definition the neutralization or defeat of Communist terrorism consists of the specialized application of counter-insurgency operations by the employment of intelligence; psychological operations; hunter-killer operations to include jungle, mountain, air, riverine, border, and village security operations; communications; logistics; specialized training and equipment, and other techniques. SIONICS, Inc. considers that the techniques designed by our Corporation to neutralize Communist terrorism in the border areas of Thailand is based on sound past experience in this field and would lead to the development of a wide-spread organization and system within the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF), the Border Patrol Police (BPP), and the Thai National Police (TNP) to counteract this threat throughout the country.

Establishment of a system and organization to neutralize the Communist threat cannot be accomplished without reliance on sound and informed military judgement based on proven techniques. SIONICS, Inc. has pioneered in the development of these techniques which permit the systematic development and use in analysis and execution of military and technical judgement.

The techniques and equipment developed for this purpose are designed and operate for the "usual or normal" case in which they will be used under combat conditions. The capability that accrues from the employment of these techniques and equipment in unusual or peculiar situations should be considered a bonus effect rather than an expected mode of operation.

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6. Critical Factors Related to Solving the Problem

Operational planning for successful counter-insurgency operations requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy, weather, terrain, [illegible] operations and capabilities, and intimate knowledge of the population within the operational area. Additionally, one of the critical factors in counter-insurgency operations is the psychological operations effort that must be geared with any operation of this type. The key to success of these operations is to identify, infiltrate, block, ambush, harrass, and otherwise neutralize the enemy. The basic concept of operations is to strike him when he is most vulnerable, in his rear areas, when he is moving to his objective, or just before he commences his attack. In order to operate in this environment special operational detachments, or hunter-killer teams, will be needed. The individuals that man these teams as well as those who command and direct them, will have to be specially trained, equipped, organized, and, above all, psychologically prepared for these operations.

As a final note this operation to be successful must be fully supported by the Royal Thai Government, the Chief U.S. Mission to Thailand, Chief JUSMAG, and COMUSMAC THAI/MACV.

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A. Objective

To arrest or neutralize Communist terrorism in the border areas of Thailand.

B. Program Title

Neutralization of Communist Terrorist Threat in Thailand (NCTTT).

C. Scope

The scope of this program encompasses a twelve month, five phase operation as follows:

Phase I - Planning, preparation, and installation of Training Center.

Phase II - Selection of personnel, organization of first RTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon (SO H/K Pltn.), and Training Program.

Phase III - Insertion of Platoon into Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility, initiation of Hunter/Killer operations, organization, training and insertion of two additional SO H/K Platoons.

Phase IV - Evaluation of operations to include amending operational concepts, organization, planning, logistics and administration.

Phase V - Expansion of operations with three SO H/K Platoons. Continuance of operations to include deep penetration missions. Preparation for further expansion of NCTTT as required.

D. Schedule

See Figure 1.

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SIONICS, Inc. will have immediately available a team of selected military and technical experts to work on the project. These personnel, led by Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III, SIONICS Field Representative in Thailand and Vietnam, will be backed by appropriate civilian technical personnel who would provide expertise as required in the general fields of sniper and special operations training and the maintenance of the operational equipment and weapons. The Corporation would assign these people to projects in accordance with their individual capabilities.

Program Schedule -- See Figure 1 (NCTTT Program Schedule, Twelve Months).

During the first week after initiation of the program, Mr. WerBell, as program manager, will meet with selected Supreme Command and Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) personnel for the initial establishment of NCTCT planning and organization of the joint MRDC/SIONICS Operations Planning Group (JSOPG). At this time he will receive an indoctrination orientation and guidance from appropriate Supreme Command and MRDC personnel. Coordination, communications channels and liaison requirements will be established. In this regard, it is anticipated that a period of from two to three weeks will be required for this initial planning and the establishment of basic and detailed joint operational plans.

During the next two weeks period, joint activity will consist of the selection of appropriate Sniper Training Team personnel from RTA units and Special Operations Hunter/ Killer Platoon personnel from appropriate RTAF, BPP and TNP

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units in Thailand. In this regard, the Sniper Team should be drawn if at all possible from the ten previously trained sniper personnel presently on duty with the Black Panther Division in Vietnam. These personnel were trained in the U. S. 9th Division Sniper Training Program in the Vietnam Delta. During this Phase personnel will be organized into the SO H/K Platoon structure.

During the period 6th through the 12th week, Platoon personnel would be undergoing the sniper training program consisting of basic firing positions and integrated acts of shooting. Additionally, during this period, JSOPG would establish standing operating procedures and effect the liaison with appropriate RTAF, CPP and TNP units in the joint Tactical Area of Operations Responsibility (TAOR) selected for the pilot program for the First Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon. Thus, at the end of the third program month, the first teams would be selected, organized, trained and ready for insertion into the TAOR.

During the next phase, the operational phase, the three Hunter/Killer teams of the First Provisional SO H/K Platoon would be inserted into the TAOR and established with appropriate Thai military and para-military border control units. At this time SIONICS advisory and technical personnel would be working closely with appropriate JSOPG opposite numbers in order to insure proper employment of the teams. It is important to note here, however, that at no time would SIONICS team personnel be expected to actually direct or enter into operational activities of the Special Operations Hunter/Killer

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[illegible]. On the contrary, [illegible] would be enjoined and prohibited from entering into any form of combat activity whatsoever.

During the operational phase, (4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th months) [illegible] personnel would follow closely SO H/K Team activities and conduct with their Thai counterparts continuous evaluation of team activities. During the entire Operational Phase continuing evaluation of the NCTTT Program would be carried on. At some time between the 5th and 6th months a mutual decision would be made with [illegible]DC officials for recommendations to be made to the RTAF Supreme Command for the expansion of team activity and the inclusion of the two additional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoons into a Special Operations Hunter/Killer Company for further operations and protection for additional villages. These operations would be continued to include deep penetration operations as appropriate and permissible providing the RTG obtains permission for across the border operations "in hot pursuit" of Communist terrorists. During the entire insertion and operational phase, it is to be underscored that psychological operations will be conducted at all times in conjunction with Special Operations Hunter/Killer Team activity. The final three months of the 12 month NCTTT program schedule would be devoted to further expansion as necessary of Special Operations Hunter/Killer team activity and/or organization of further Special Operations Hunter/Killer Companies for employment throughout the border areas of Thailand.

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E. Organization and Management (See Figure 2)

Because of the importance which SIONICS, Inc. attaches to the proposed program, we will keep close top management cognizance of this project. The responsible officer (Mr. WerBell) is a Director and Vice President of SIONICS and will report directly to the President of the Corporation. In this manner, we can assure you that to the extent necessary, the full resources of the Corporation can be made available to guarantee a fully satisfactory program.

In managing this project we proposed to guarantee continually and consistency throughout the entire period of this effort. The key to this, of course, rests with the personnel assigned. Frequent changes in personnel will be avoided, and if changes are required, because of new skills being required, replacement personnel will be phased in with adequate overlap wherever possible. A full resume on Mr. WerBell may be found in Part VI of this proposal. It is to be noted that he has had considerable experience in the counter-insurgency field, having served in South Vietnam and the Far East for SIONICS since September of 1968. He has had long experience in weapons and clandestine operations dating back to World War II at which time he was a parachute unit Commander of a Special Operations group in OSS units operating in the Far East. Since that time he has been continuously interested in development of exotic weaponry and is the holder of several patents in this field. Since 1958, he has devoted practically all of his time in anti-communist activities throughout Central and South America

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[illegible] has advised a number of Central American governments on counter insurgency activities and development of weapons techniques for this purpose.

The Program Manager would be assisted by a staff of extremely competent experts chosen from his wide cognizance and knowledge of counter-insurgency experts throughout the free world. He would be assisted when necessary by Major General Harold E. Watson, Director of BIONICS and in charge of technical planning. His knowledge and background in corporate planning, world-wide government, and corporate contracts is considered invaluable to the BIONICS group.

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IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General Concept

The purpose of this program will be to strike the Communist insurgents where they are most vulnerable and to mesh the operations of selected Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams into present Royal Thai Government ongoing Counterinsurgency Programs based on the proven and historic causes of victory over the Communists:

Aggressive anti-guerrilla tactics.

Removal of sections of the population thus depriving insurgents of contact with the people.

Removal of the support of the population.

In attacking Communist terrorist vulnerability, the Special Operations Hunter/Killer program will be designed to operate against the enemy and concentrate on the following categories of insurgent vulnerability:

1. Insurgent base area system which, although fragmented, is a coherent complex of combat, combat support, and combat service support facilities and activities which embrace populated as well as remote areas. In this, Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams will, in the final phases of the operation, be directed to attack or operate on the perimeters of insurgent base area systems.

2. Insurgent combat units in avoiding prolonged combat may use escape routes that will subject them ideally to ambush by Hunter/Killer Teams. In this, the classic principals of "the hammer and anvil operation" will be employed. Helicopter

[illegible] development of Special Operations Hunter/Killer [illegible] will [illegible] in effective and swift team insertion and with- [illegible] at the [illegible] moment.

3. Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams will operate within the [illegible] areas and village complexes in order to operate directly within the population against and within which [illegible]unist terrorists operate.

4. Operational Phasing

1. Phase I - Planning, Preparation, and Installation of Training Center.

Initiation of planning by SIGHICS Program Manager with [illegible] Supreme Command and Hq. Military Research and Development (MRDC) selected personnel. Establishment of a Joint MRDC/ SIGHICS Special Operations Planning Group (JSOPG) to develop detailed plans for the organization, training and operational employment of an RTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon. In this, the JSOPG may be expanded to include selected personnel from JUSMAG, USOM, and ARPA as required.

a. Training Center and Program

(1) Establishment of the Training Center

A RTG Sniper School and Special Operations Training Center will be established at a location to be designated. As a basis for school personnel, a team of one officer and ten NCO's will be selected. In order to save the five to six weeks required to train this team it will be necessary to draw this team from the ten members of the RTA Black Panther Division who

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graduated from the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School in Vietnam. One member of the team must be an experienced gunner familiar with M-14 accurizing techniques. Additional RTA offices and NCO personnel will be required to staff the Center with instructors in special operations, artillery fire adjustment, navigation, map reading and deception operations. A certain number of Training Center command administrative personnel will also be required.

(2) Training Facility

A sniper training facility will be constructed to accommodate 30 students. The facility should include a 40 point firing range and adjacent classrooms. The range should be built with target facilities at 150, 300, 600, and 900 meters. A moving target should be built on the 300 meter butt in addition to the fixed targets at that position.

c. Equipment

(1) The sniper teams of the SOW/K Pltn. will be equipped with National Match Grade M-14 rifles obtained by urgent RTG request to JUSMAG. These rifles are glass bedded into impregnated stocks which are impervious to water. The rifles are carefully tuned to provide a high degree of accuracy.

(2) The accurized M-14 rifles will be equipped with a 3-9 variable power adjustable ranging telescope sight (ART). The telescope is mounted in conjunction with a ballistic cam. The sight reticle includes a pair of stadia lines. By varying the power of the telescope until the stadia lines define a 30 inch area on the target, the ballistic cam

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[illegible] the sight to the proper elevation for that distance. Errors due to range estimation are virtually eliminated with this system. As an alternate the M-14 accurized rifle could be equipped with the M84 telescope. These sights are a fixed 2.2 power telescope with a post reticle. Using the M84 the sniper must accurately estimate the gun target range and either hold over the target or adjust the elevating mechanism on the sight to the estimated range.

(3) For night operations at least one half of the sniper rifles will be equipped with the VARO Starlight Scope. VARO Starlight Scopes will be mounted on the M-14 rifles at the sniper school and zeroed during training. The sniper retains his own scope/rifle/suppressor combination during subsequent operations. This procedure assures retention of zero even though the sight is dismounted during daylight operations and remounted for night operations.

(4) The ammunition used in sniper training and combat must be 7.62mm U. S. National Match Grade.

(5) All M-14 sniper rifles will be filled with the [illegible] noise suppressor. (See Inclosure 1 for complete description). As noted above, each student will retain his own rifle/scope/suppressor combination during subsequent operations.

(6) Additional to the basic sniper rifle/scope/suppressor combination, the SO H/K Pltn. will be equipped with alternate noise suppressed weapons on as required by the

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[illegible] ammunition, demolition, and individual equipment will also be provided as required.

2. Phase II - Organization and Training

a. Selection of Personnel

The JSOPC will, during the 4th and 5th week select a total of 80 highly qualified and motivated personnel. Students accepted into the sniper program will be selected from volunteers. Those who are selected must have 20/20 vision, have qualified as an expert rifleman and be well motivated soldiers. Experience in competitive marksmanship is preferred but is not mandatory.

b. Organization

See Figure 3.

The first PTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon will be organized into a Platoon Headquarters and three Hunter/Killer teams as shown. Double Slotting will be authorized during Phase II to provide for an estimated 30% attrition rate. This figure is based on the average attrition rate at the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School in Vietnam. Thus, total training strength will be 2 officers, 12 NCO's, and 66 Junior NCO's or enlisted men for a total of 80 officers and men. Operational strength will be as shown on Figure 3.

c. Training Program

Prior to selection and organization of selected student candidates for the PTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon (SO H/K Pltn.) a training program will be prepared and rehearsed with the following as basic precepts:

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(i) The training will be of six weeks duration and include basic firing positions, and the integrated act of [illegible], trigger squeeze, breath control, sight alignment, and sight picture. Students will be taught the techniques of estimating lead and engaging moving targets. Instruction will be provided on the methods for estimating wind over extreme ranges so that a firer can off set his point of aim to place the bullet on target. Following this, students will learn the methods of zeroing M-14 accurized rifles equipped with the adjustable ranging telescopic sight (ART), the VARO Starlight Scope or the fixed power M84 telescopic sight, and the SIONICS-MAW-2 suppressor. Night firing will be included in the course and each student will learn to engage targets with his starlight scope at ranges of 1[illegible], 300, and 600 meters.

(ii) In addition to marksmanship training, students will be schooled in adjustment of artillery fire, day/night land navigation, map reading, and deception operations (See Table A). Each of these subjects is important to the sniper. He frequently must select his position from a situation map and then travel to that location at night. It is essential that he select the optimum position, know his position in relationship to friendly units and be able to navigate to his preselected position. The ability to accurately adjust artillery fire is important to a sniper. He frequently must adjust illuminating rounds skillfully so that illumination is placed on target in such a manner as to illuminate the target and not compromise

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the sniper's position or that of an adjacent friendly unit.

(iii) Qualification firing will be conducted during the last week of the course. Silhouette targets will be engaged at 150,300,600 and 900 meters with eight targets being engaged by each man during two qualifying courses. Ten points will be awarded for a first round hit and five points for a second round hit. A maximum score is 160 points. A minimum qualifying score is 130.

(iv) Experience gained from the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School shows that approximately 50% of the students successfully complete the course. Thus, at least double the number of final candidates required should be selected to attend the school.

d. Equipment

See Figure 4.

3. Phase III - Development and Insertion of Hunter/Killer Teams, Initiation of Operations

a. Insertion (See Figure 5.)

During this phase the First RTG Provisional SOT H/K Pltn. will be inserted into a Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility (TAOR) under operational control of a Royal Thai Army or Border Patrol Police unit. The Platoon will operate under operational control of the RTA or BPP Commander who will be advised in the employment of the Special Operational Team and the three Hunter/Killer Teams by selected members of the JSOPG.

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B. Initiation of Operations:

Initially and until [illegible] are established, [illegible] will be [illegible] to carry out the following type missions:

(1) Ambush patrols:

Snipers from H/K Teams will be attached to [illegible] or [illegible] units and deployed with ambush patrols. This technique has been the most successful method of employment. Two techniques will be used extensively:

(a) <u>Snipers accompany a platoon ambush.</u> When employed with a platoon ambush, the snipers will remain close to the platoon command post. When an element of the platoon observes enemy activity, the snipers are alerted to that location. They then engage selectively at night with the starlight scope and [illegible]-A2 suppressors or with the ART scope and MAW-A2 suppressor during daylight. If there is but one Viet Cong in the area, he is taken under fire by a sniper. In this way the ambush position and location of automatic weapons are not compromised due to the quiet operation of the rifle. When a group of communists approach the killing zone, the snipers engage the leaders and radio operators while the platoon fires into the general kill zone. Another technique will be used in an ambush is that of having the snipers fire tracers to mark the flanks of an enemy force which has approached the position in an area other than the specified kill zone. Snipers are also used to engage the enemy who probe the ambush site in order to attempt to draw fire

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prematurely. This avoids the disclosure of automatic weapons positions and detonation of claymore mines or other anti-disturbance/warning devices.

(i) Snipers with Security Element in Ambush. The second method of employment will be that of placing snipers and a five to eight man security element in a carefully selected sniper/ambush position. The general area will be selected by the NTA or BRP commander after considering enemy activity in the area and the advice of the sniper team. The team will then be moved to a NTA or BRP forward position where it is joined by the security element equipped with M-16's, an M79, and an AN/PRC-25 radio. The sniper/ambush position will be occupied just prior to dark and selected to provide maximum range of fires and location within a reasonable distance from a friendly unit. The snipers maintain continuous surveillance of the area. Eye fatigue at night is minimized by having the snipers alternate use of the starlight scope throughout the night. The M79 is an especially useful weapon at the sniper/ambush position. As an example, the enemy frequently have been observed in a tree line or vegetated area in which a shot was not possible due to low light level. Using tracer fire and by directing M79 fire into the area, the security element forced the enemy to move and expose themselves to subsequent sniper fire.

(ii) Stay-Behinds

H/K Teams trained for long range operations will be extremely effective in engaging enemy ambushers who follow

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a [illegible] unit as it moves from one location to another. In this case a sniper team with a 5-8 man security element is selected to provide long range observation of the route over which the unit will travel and pick off the enemy as they follow in ambush. Snipers with their telescope sights and MAW-2 suppressors will be able to engage the enemy at ranges out to 900 meters. At extreme ranges, the enemy will usually not be cautious about his cover and concealment. Thus, he presents an excellent target for the H/K team.

(iii) Off-Set

(a) A VARO Xenon search light will be used to illuminate covertly an area with pink light. The starlight scope is sensitive to a portion of the infrared band that is pink and near the visible light portion of the spectrum. By using a pink filter on a Xenon search light an area can be illuminated with invisible light that registers in the starlight scope. This phenomena will be used in two types of sniper activity; village or perimeter security and ambush operations. Employment of the rifle/scope/suppressor combination will frequently result in the enemy receiving many casualties before he has been taken under fire.

(b) Ambushes will be conducted by placing a searchlight equipped 1/4 ton vehicle 1200 to 1500 meters from a road intersection. Snipers equipped with starlight scopes and MAW-2 suppressors will be placed 300 meters from the intersection and maintain radio contact with the searchlight operator. The sniper

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will control the covert illumination of the intersection and surrounding area [illegible] the communists appear in the kill zone they will [illegible] the sniper team. Thus, by off-setting the sniper team from the searchlight and placing the searchlight and 1/4 ton vehicle in a position remote from the ambush site, the enemy in the kill zone will not be alerted by the noise of the running vehicle engine.

(c) The VARO pink light/sniper combination will be employed in base camp security operations. The searchlight, mounted on a 1/4 ton vehicle responds to radio equipped sniper teams in positions either on the perimeter or on ambush positions outside the perimeter. The background noise of a village or fixed base camp usually conceals the noise of the engine and activity of the searchlight crew. In forward base camps the searchlight remains in the center of the base camp and, by swinging its beam through 360 degrees, covertly illuminates avenues of approach into the position. With this method it is again essential that the sniper teams maintain radio contact with the searchlight crew. The pink light is particularly useful during the dark of the moon period.

(iv) Counter Sniper

H/K Teams are effective in countering enemy sniper activity. Each team, equipped with its telescopic sight and M49 Spotting Scope, will search the area of suspected sniper activity. The optical equipment permits a detailed search of distant areas. A recent example, in Vietnam, is

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[illegible] of a unit, after having been fired on by a Viet Cong sniper from [illegible] range, deployed its sniper team. The team searched the tree line with its optical equipment and the Viet Cong sniper was discovered in a tree at 720 meters distance. While one team member [illegible] the wind using the M49 spotting scope, the other man fired one round, killing the Viet Cong sniper.

(v) Night Hunter Operations

Night Hunter Operations will be conducted to mark targets. A sniper team of 2 men placed in a lead helicopter observe the ground with the starlight scopes mounted on their rifles. When the enemy is sighted, the snipers engage with tracers. Helicopter gun ships, following at a higher altitude then engage the targets. Artillery HE and illumination are adjusted on target as necessary.

(vi) Special Operations

The Special Operation Team, sniper-trained, will be employed under Platoon Commander control for coup-de-main, sabotage/demolition, and sniper activities against the enemy as dictated by the situation and requirements of the [illegible]/RPF unit counter-terrorist plan.

[illegible] Subsequent Operations

As experience is gained with combined Sniper team and host unit [illegible]TA or RPF operations, the Special Operations and Hunter/Killer Teams will gradually expand operations to fulfill their basic roles -- that of independently operating teams moving silently to interdict, ambush and destroy the enemy

a [illegible] he moves close to his chosen targets. [illegible] or other indigenous tribesmen will be [illegible] as trackers and [illegible] operating much the same as did the Malayan jungle trackers with British Hunter/Killer teams in Malaya from [illegible] to [illegible].

c. Psychological Operations

Hunter/Killer operations in conjunction with [illegible] and BPP units, or with [illegible] Mobile Training Units must include provision for comprehensive psychological operations. There is no method better designed to strike terror into the heart of the communist terrorist than to see his comrades-in-arms killed, as if by magic, by a silent bullet fired from some "unknown" and distant source. Thus, the inherent long-range flexibility and effectiveness of the rifle/scope/suppressor/sniper combination must be exploited to its fullest. Rumor campaigns, 'silver bullet' propaganda, leaflet drops, airborne loudspeaker "talking bird" operations, and other classic psychological operations techniques must all drum home the theme that the communist terrorist is no longer safe in his sanctuary areas nor does he enjoy the classic guerrilla initiative as he once was taught to believe. Aggressive Hunter/Killer operations combined with astute and massive psychological operations will be employed to destroy communist terrorists will to fight and, most importantly, to discourage local indigenous tribesmen from joining communist ranks.

2.12

4. <u>Phase IV - Evaluation</u>

The NCTTT Program will be subject to close and continuing evaluation by a MRDC Test and Evaluation Team organized and fielded by the JSOPG. Comprehensive records and test data will be gathered and analyzed in order to amend operational concepts and organizations as well as administrative, logistical, and training techniques as required. The Test and Evaluation Team should adhere to accepted principles of field experimentation as appropriate; e.g., the evaluation should be an elaboration of common sense and convenient ordering of evaluation matters so that the Hunter/Killer Teams encounter minimum interruptions.

Upon completion of the Evaluation Phase the T&E Unit will make appropriate recommendations to MRDC for continuation and expansion of the NCTTT Program beyond the 12 month planned period.

5. <u>Phase V - Expansion of Operations</u>

See Figure 1.

As indicated on Figure 1, preparation for the Expansion of Operations Phase commences in the tenth week of the NCTTT with the organization of the Second RTG Provisional SO H/K Platoon. The six-week training program for the Second Platoon starts the 13th week upon graduation of the First Platoon. The second Platoon deploys in the 18th week and conducts Phase III operations as described in Paragraph D above.

Commencing with the 14th week, the Third Provisional RTG SO H/K Pltn. is organized commencing training the 18th week, and Phase III operations the 24th week.

2.12

At the end of Phase III there will thus be three [illegible] Platoons totalling, three Special Operations and 9 Sniper [illegible] Teams operating against [illegible] Communist terrorists in the field.

At the end of Phase III (end of [illegible] months) and following recommendations of the [illegible] T&E Team, the Supreme Command will have two options.

(a) Organize the three platoons into a Provisional [illegible] Company (See Figure 6) and continue further operations, or

(b) Reassign Special Operation Teams to RTA, [illegible], and [illegible] units as required and continue further operations.

During the final three months of the [illegible] Program, operations will be progressively expanded to provide for protection of additional villages. Operations will be continued deep into enemy controlled areas utilizing helicopter or parachute insertion techniques. HALO parachute insertion techniques will be employed in areas where the enemy is especially vigilant. Operations should be carried out whenever possible to ambush, attack, harrass, and pursue the enemy as far as 10 to 20 miles inside the borders of LAOS, providing RLG permission is obtained. In order to accomplish this, safe areas should be established within friendly [illegible] or other indigenous tribal villages for team rest, recuperation, and eventual extraction by helicopter or [illegible] aircraft. Wherever possible, similar operations should be conducted across the [illegible] border.

2.12

6. Future Operations

At the end of Phase V the NCTTT should have proved itself as one of the most effective counter-insurgency programs available to the RTG. As an example, in 6 months operations the 72 snipers of the U. S. 9th Division attained over 600 confirmed kills, the majority of which were made at night with the M-14 rifle/Starlight Scope/SIONICS-MAW-A2 suppressor combination. In effecting this admirable record, 1.37 cartridges were expended per kill. At the current cost of 28¢ for one National Match cartridge, this averages to 38¢ per kill. This is obviously an oversimplification, but it highlights an extremely successful and economical method of countering communist terrorism along the borders of Thailand.

As a final note, this type of operation is as yet in its nascent stages. Complete operational techniques that will result from execution of the 12 month NCTTT will undoubtedly disclose additional and more effective techniques of killing or neutralizing communist terrorists in Thailand and will contribute immeasurably to bringing stability and RTG control into its border areas.

2.12

NCTTT PROGRAM

CONTRACT MONTHS




FIGURE 1 - OPERATIONAL SCHEDULE

NCTTT





FIGURE 2 - ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
NCTTT

RTG PROVISIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS
HUNTER/KILLER PLATOON



STRENGTH
1
4
33 Jr. NCO/EM

43 Total

FIGURE 3 - RTG PROV. SO H/K PLTN.

2.18

RTG-PROVISIONAL - SPECIAL OPERATIONS
HUNTER/KILLER PLATOON

LIST OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

1. PLATOON HEADQUARTERS (1 Set)

a. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

2 M-14 Accurized Rifles
2 ART Sniper Scopes (M-84 Scope, Alternate)
2 Sionics MAW-A2 Suppressors
2 VARO Starlight Scopes
2 M-16 w/MAW-A1 Sup.
1 PRC-25 or Eqiv. Radio Trans./Recvr.

b. PLATOON WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT POOL (1 Set)

8 M-16 w/MAW-A1 Sup.
8 M-10 Ingram SMG w/Sionics Sup.
8 Pistol (To be desig.) w/Sionics Sup.
5 Cases B-40 Mini-Hand Grenades
10 Cases HALFA 35mm Phosphorus Grenades
1000 Rounds .38, .45 or 9mm Flare Bullets
Demolition and Incendiary Equipment and Supplies as required

c. SO H/K OR H/K TEAM EQUIPMENT (4 Sets)

9 M-14 Accurized Rifles
9 ART Sniper Scopes (M-84 Scope, Alt.)
9 Sionics MAW-A2 Suppressors
9 VARO Starlight Scopes
1 PRT-4 Radio Transmitter
9 PRT-9 Helmet Radio Receivers
Demolition and Incendiary Supplies and Equipment as required

FIGURE 4 - EQUIPMENT

2.1d

NCTTT
TACTICAL AREA OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(TAOR)
TYPICAL H/K TEAM AREA DEPLOYMENT





FIGURE - TAOR

14-00000

RTC PROVISIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS HUNTER KILLER COMPANY



STRENGTH

5 O
19 NCO
100 Jr. NCO/EM
124 Total

FIGURE 6 -RTC PROV. SO H/K COMPANY

212

PART I: Planning, Preparation, and Training Phases

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: ____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase I: Planning, Preparation and Installation of Training Center, through
Phase II: Organization and Training

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

	Totals
Salaries (direct charges at actual rate):	
Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level:	
_______ man-mos. @ $_________ av. per man-mo.	$__________
Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level:	
_______ man mos. @ $_________ av. per man-mo.	$__________
Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technician level;	
_______ man-mos. @ $_________ av. per man-mo.	$__________
Total billable salaries:	$__________
Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at ________%	$__________
Overtime premium pay Estimated at ________%	$__________
Office and Secretarial:	$__________
Purchased expendable materials and services:	$__________
Travel:	$__________
Long-distance communication charges:	$__________
TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS	$__________
FIXED FEE (7%)	$__________
TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee	$__________

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government official channels.

PART II: Operational and Evaluation Phase

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: ______ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase III: Deployment, Insertion and initiation of Operations, through Phase IV: Evaluation of Program

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

	Totals
Salaries (direct charges at actual rates):	
Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level: ______ man-mos. @ $__________ av. per man-mo.	$__________
Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level: ______ man-mos. @ $__________ av. per man-mo.	$__________
Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technician level: ______ man-mos. @ $__________ av. per man-mo.	$__________
Total billable salaries:	$__________
Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at ______%	$__________
Overtime premium pay Estimated at ______%	$__________
Office and Secretarial:	$__________
Purchased expendable materials and services:	$__________
Travel:	$__________
Long-distance communication charges:	$__________
~~TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS~~	$__________
FIXED FEE (7%)	$__________
TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee	$__________

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government official channels.

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED:_____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase V: Expansion of Operations

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

	Totals
Salaries (direct charges at actual rates):	
Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level: _____ man-mos. @ $_____ av. per man-mo.	$_____
Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level: _____ man-mos. @ $_____ av. per man-mo.	$_____
Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technical level: _____ man-mos. @ $_____ av. per man-mo.	$_____
Total billable salaries:	$_____
Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at _____%	$_____
Overtime premium pay Estimated at _____%	$_____
Office and Secretarial:	$_____
Purchased expendable materials and services:	$_____
Travel:	$_____
Long-distance communication charges:	$_____
TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS	$_____
FIXED FEE (7%)	$_____
TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee	$_____

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government official channels.

2.12

14-00000

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DATE: 3 MAY 1969

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER

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FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: FE 4 FILE, VR. RI/AN FI2 CI CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

03 18 15 Z MAY 69

CITE DIRECTOR 93804

TO BANGKOK

PBRAMPART

REF DIRECTOR 88114

1. WE NOTE LNSHOE QUERY DATED 2 MAY TO ITS HQS ASKING FOR TRACES ON MITCHELL L. WERBELL. WISH TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION REF WHICH REPLIED TO RECENT STATION REQUEST FOR TRACES ON WERBELL. SUGGEST YOU MAY WISH PASS GIST OF REF ON FYI BASIS TO LOCAL LNSHOE REPS.

2. ~~KENX~~ FILE: 201-259910.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD William Johnson CI/OPS/FE (Telecord)

William W. Wells
ACFE

Clifton R. Strathern
CFE/TBL

CS COPY

201-259910
3 May 69

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Dept. of Defense
(National Military Command Center
Message Center)
98952
2 May 69 (6 May 69)
Subject: Request for Information

Action: DIA-20

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: R.G.Weidner/dsr
UNIT: FE/TBL/T
EXT: 1421
DATE: 27 March 1969

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RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
following action is authorized: Destruction
Edward Earley
Signed: SOD 3
R.O. #276 - Unit FE/TBLT
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 43/53 PER ___

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CONF: C/FE 4 INFO: FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/FI2, C/CI, C/SOD 3

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 20 22 1 MAR 69

CITE DIRECTOR 8 3 1 1 4

TO BANGKOK

ABSTRACT FE/TBL

REF: BANGKOK 0411 (IN 16820)

1. HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 FILE ON SUBJECT REF WHO HAS LONG HISTORY OF POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE HE CAN MAKE A FEW FAST BUCKS. HE IS CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, A WHEELER AND DEALER, AND A PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE HAS A REPUTATION FOR LIVING BEYOND HIS MEANS AND IS HIGH PRESSURE ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION MAN. HE WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID 1959 WHEN HE BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED TO FURNISH WOFIRM WITH INFORMATION ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN THE CARRIBEAN. HE WAS GRANTED A POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS WAS CANCELLED IN OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFORMATION PROVED TO BE OF LITTLE VALUE AND IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT HE WAS USING WOFIRM FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. HE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY ATTEMPTED TO PASS HIMSELF OFF AS REPRESENTATIVE OF LNHARP AND WOFIRM. HE WAS BORN 1918 IN PHILADELPHIA AND DID

CS COPY /CONTINUED/

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER 28 Mar 69

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BY ______ PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

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SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 99114

SERVE WITH OSS DURING WORLD WAR II. HE HAD OWN ADVERTISING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS BUSINESS IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA WHICH WENT BANKRUPT IN 1959. TRACES ON HIS CURRENT FIRM NEGATIVE.

2. ABOVE CANNOT BE PASSED TO THAIS SINCE SUBJECT REF IS WOLADY CITIZEN, HOWEVER YOU MAY WISH TO INFORM APPROPRIATE LIAISON CONTACTS THAT SUBJECT IS REPUTED TO HAVE UNSAVORY REPUTATION, HAS NO CONNECTIONS WITH LNHARP DESPITE ANY INTIMATIONS HE MAY MAKE TO CONTRARY, AND THAT THAIS WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO OBSERVE EXTREME CAUTION RE ANY DEALINGS WITH HIM.

3. FILE: 201-259910

END OF MESSAGE

CI/OPS/FE Robert E. [signature]

[signature]
William E. Nelson
C/CFE

CW

[signature]
Clifton R. Strathern
CFE/TBL

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566

S E C R E T 181127Z MAR 69 CITE BANGKOK 2411 18 MAR 69 IN 16820

DIRECTOR

REQUEST HQS TRACES ON MITCHELL L. WERBELL III AND HIS FIRM SIONICS, 1655 PEACH TREE ST., N.E., ATLANTA, GEORGIA. WERBELL IS HERE OFFERING TO SELL THE LATEST FIREARMS TO RTG. HE HAS PRESENTED SOME OF THESE WEAPONS TO THE KING.

S E C R E T

18 MAR 1969

Chief

D/C

1.

2.

3.

4.

Chrono

WITHIN 24 HOURS

Traces

SECRET

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Ralph H. Jusell Employee Activity Branch 3 E 49, Hdqtrs.	7720	DATE 26 March 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/Security 3 D 3113				For your information. NR on Baker in OS files.
2.				
3.				
4. WH/COG				
5. attn: Nancy Gratz				
6.				
7. RI/AN	13 AUG 1968			5-7 please index
8. RI/EOI				
9. RI/FILES				5-9 please file 201-259910
10.				
11.				AN 2 / AB X / IN X / FS / RI 2 / DESTROYED / FI
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-259910

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14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

1P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, OP/RD

DATE: 4 March 1968

4 MAR 68

XAAZ 28107

FROM : L. L. Curran

SUBJECT: BAKER, Bruce Arman

On 7 February, this gentleman telephoned my office. His address is:

Mr. Bruce Arman BAKER
11379 President Drive, N. E.
Blaine Village, Minnesota

Δ U.S.A CIT: U.S.A

Mr. Baker stated that he has been in contact with a Mr. MITCHELL WERBELL, III of Powder Springs, Georgia. 201-259910

Mr. Baker says that Mr. Werbell is in the business of manufacturing weapons and delivering them by air throughout the world. Mr. Baker understands that Mr. Werbell does this for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Baker says that Mr. Werbell is a supposedly reputable man. Baker understands, from Werbell, that Baker will have to get a CIA security clearance to fly for Werbell.

Mr. Baker has served in the military. He has had some paramilitary training. He belongs in a "jump club" and now participates in "freefall", etc. He has a Morse Code proficiency and a Radio License Second Class. He has Spanish language proficiency and would be willing to collect for us.

This man persists on pursuing me re this CIA/Werbell relationship. I tell him I don't know a thing about it. It seems he has a smuggling record when he was 17 and he's afraid this may keep him from getting this Werbell "CIA" clearance.

L.
L. L. Curran

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

LLC:sb

Baker requests no contact on his wife re this deal. She is not witting. L

201-259910

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

When war breaks out anywhere in the world, former OSS man Mitch WerBell is eager and able to supply weapons to either side—or both. And he's only one of several high-flying operators in a dark and growing trade

The Deadliest Salesman

Newsfront

[illegible]

It is entirely possible, as claimed, that none of America's high-ranking officials received any advance warning of the outbreak of hostilities which ended in Israel's "blitzkrieg" victory over her Arab neighbors. But at least *one* American authority on modern warfare did. He is a ruddy, moustached, ramrod-backed, onetime OSS operative named Mitchell Livingston WerBell III. Two days before the Middle East fighting began last June, he left his Georgia country manor an hour before daybreak, drove the 25 miles to Atlanta airport in 19 minutes and boarded a jet for New York hand carrying a large, square valise which had been custom-made for him in Germany.

In Manhattan, WerBell checked in at the City Squire Inn, went to a double room still carrying the valise, and set it between his legs while he made several phone calls to numbers he looked up in a slim leather notebook. Precisely at noon, he reentered the elevator and pushed the "lobby" button with the unhurried cool of someone absolutely certain that a chauffeur-driven limousine is waiting downstairs—which he was: which *it* was.


A couple of hours later, after crossing Manhattan and boarding a private yacht




WerBell relaxes, above, at plush Puerto Rico hotel between arms deals. Note holster gun on r.h. opp. page.

2.5

14-00000



Mitch WerBell and two aides look over route on map prior to a night delivery of weapons somewhere in the Caribbean.




For another Caribbean mission, small boat is towed close so that arms can be transferred for speedy run to the shore.

on the East River, WerBell finally opened his valise and displayed its contents: a half-dozen missile guns, both hand and shoulder weapons, which fire a small, self-guided rocket instead of the conventional bullet. WerBell had designed and built some of them himself.


Around him, crowding the yacht's stateroom, solid-looking, somber men watched intently as WerBell demonstrated the new firearms' awesome potential. Later that evening, recalling the demonstration over a drink back in the city, WerBell would describe his nautical hosts only by saying, "They were . . . let's just call them very important friends of Israel. They'd been warned that within days the Mideast would be at war. They were there to make sure that one way or another Israel got a crack at the very best weaponry there is. Not just for the campaign ahead, but for the stand-off which is bound to keep the Middle East under tension for years."

Clandestine meetings like this are part of Mitch WerBell's stock in trade. He is a firearms broker of the new breed known as M.M.'s—munitions manipulators. In a world of localized wars—from Yemen to

2.5



Arms brokers are a curious blend of past and present. Here WerBell, dashing as a Prussian noble, tests MBA rocket pistol.



WerBell, who likes to design arms as well as sell them, examines some of his collection in the "weapons room" of his Georgia home.

Angola to Bolivia—M.M.'s are the new V.I.P.'s of international politics. It is their business to know even before diplomats do where tensions are brewing that bring potential customers. Their most satisfying status symbol is the discovery that somewhere on the globe their merchandise is shooting away, back and forth, on *both* sides of the same conflict.

Heading south from Miami, one's first look at the Bahamas schooners and converted subchasers plowing the blue water with cargoes of arms from such dealers, recalls nothing so much as the rum-running boom of Prohibition years. But a diligent student soon discovers that alcohol and armaments have little in common; the munitions business is a vast, worldwide trade influencing the destiny of governments, nations, political parties—and the men who command them.

Take the recent assassination attempt against Santo Domingo's military strong man, Gen. Antonio Imbert. Driving homeward on Henriquez Urena Street, General Imbert suddenly saw seven silver stars spurt across the windshield of his Cadillac. Even before [*Continued on page 73*]

2.5

14-00000

shapes, not an unusual pattern to find in various parts of the world today.

On the mound prairies, ice formed in the cracks. As the ice built up, more soil was shoveled up into the polygons of earth and the cracks themselves widened. Finally the earth blocks froze too. When a big thaw set in, the ice in the cracks thawed faster than the earth blocks and flowed away, leaving big polygons of earth standing on the prairies.

What happened next is what happens to a melting ice cube. Its outside edges melt away first so that the cube dwindles into a sphere. The polygons of earth went through the same process. The corners of the earth blocks thawed faster than the sides. Then, while the cores were still frozen, the whole area was submerged for a short time by an ice-choked flood river. The rush of water swept away the thawed material and when the water subsided, what was left were dome-shaped Mima mounds.

In areas where the running water had covered them for only a short time, the mounds were big. Where the water flowed longer, more thawing took place and the mounds were small.

A very satisfying theory. But as usual, other scientists have picked flaws in it. For one thing, they question if the area had the sort of climate which Ritchie describes. They say it was not much colder during the mound-forming period than it is today. And they doubt if the prairies were swept by a flood of water deep enough to cover all the mounds. It would have had to be over 100 feet deep.

Some of the critics are gopher-theory men. The pocket-gopher theory has been around for 25 years gaining supporters steadily. It particularly excites biologists, because if Mima mounds really turn out to have been made by gophers, they would be the most extraordinary structures (if not the biggest) ever made by any mammal except man.

The gopher possibility first occurred to Walter W. Dalquist back in 1941 when he was making a survey of the mammals of southern Washington. He later developed the theory with Victor Sheffer, a biologist with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

As they point out, wherever there are Mima mounds, there are also gophers, with the exception of Mima Prairie where the finest mounds of all are found. And at one time there were gophers on Mima Prairie, too. Evidence proves it.

The gopher they are talking about is a small brown animal, looks rather like a rat, and is called a "pocket" gopher because it has a fur-lined pocket in its cheek for carrying around food and nest material.

This is the way the biologists explain the gopher theory. As the Vashon ice sheet retreated and vegetation grew up in its wake, pocket gophers began moving in from the south, probably only advancing a hundred feet or so in a gopher generation. Finally at the southern end of Puget Sound, they ran into a new young evergreen forest which had sprung up ahead of them.

Gophers will not live in the shade of a forest so instead of pushing on farther, they dug in on the prairies. As a protection against predators they dug deep.

Each Mima mound represents what at one time was the "territory" of an ancient gopher family. When they built their foraging tunnels, they kept on dragging a little more soil back toward the home site than they took away from it. After thousands of years, those infinitesimal amounts of soil would have built up into a Mima mound. The mysterious mound roots which extend into the gravel below the mounds are abandoned gopher tunnels which have filled up with black silt.

"But not all Mima mounds have mound roots," opponents of the theory point out. They carp at other details, too. As one geologist wrote, "After diligent search, more than 50 stones, ranging in size from two to 20 inches in diameter have been found inside the mounds, well above their base." And how could any gopher shove a stone the size of a football up to the top of his nest?

What the next theory will be is anybody's guess, but the ultimate touch of confusion has already been added. There are those who say the Mima mounds are growing. Nor is this a new idea. Over 30 years ago, farmers in the area started talking about it. "Sure they're growing. When I was a kid they were level with the top of the chicken coop. Now they're several inches taller."

The growing theory cannot be passed off with a hearty chuckle either. Some keen observers have been taking the idea seriously—Doctor Sheffer, for one—although nobody can prove scientifically whether they are growing, shrinking or staying the same. In fact, only one thing is sure about the whole Mima hassle. If something is not done soon, there will not be many Mima mounds left to puzzle over. Acres of them have been leveled for farming. Still others have been dug up for gravel pits and cut through for highways and railroads. Not that the conservation-minded State of Washington would ever let them disappear entirely. A good thing, too. Because if those mystery mounds really are growing, we are going to have more puzzles to grapple with—like what on earth is making them grow bigger? And where, by all that is sane, are they going to end? —**Jean Muir**

THE DEADLIEST SALESMEN
[*Continued from page 43*]

he heard the stutter of silencer-equipped submachine guns, he knew that a long-anticipated event was taking place—an attempt was being made to kill him.

To duck the assassins' bullets, the general dropped sideways. His arm snaked behind the front seat of the limousine where his own submachine gun hung in a rack. But Imbert's life was saved by a different and wholly unexpected sort of weapon.

In the escort jeep, the general's chief bodyguard, Maj. Marino Garcia, flicked a spring-loaded switch on the brown leather swagger stick under his arm. The stick—suddenly converted into a miniature missile launcher—spat forth a high-speed .50 caliber rocket projectile. With a chilling "*SWOOSH*" the small missile from the most powerful handgun now in existence blew apart the windshield of the attackers' Oldsmobile. The car turned and fled.

Outside the island confines of the Dominican Republic (where it set off yet another national crisis), nobody heard the news of the ambush with greater interest than WerBell. He was delighted by General Imbert's escape. He has warm personal relations with a number of Latin strong men, and the portly Dominican warlord has been an especially close friend. And it was WerBell who had invented and delivered the shooting stick that apparently saved the situation. Moreover, WerBell discovered, from a detailed description of the assassins' guns, that the ambush weapons, too, came from a lot he had passed on to the Dominican armed forces some years earlier.

In relation to the total worldwide munitions trade the equipment supplied by the private dealers is a drop in the sea—the world turnover in munitions is estimated at 350 billion dollars a year. Still, munitions manipulators like WerBell account for the fastest-growing portion of this vast business.

"The impact of private arms shipments into the underdeveloped world has been sensational," wrote military specialist Jack Raymond of *The New York Times* last year. "So fragile are the instruments of government, so slender, sometimes, their base of popular support, so vulnerable are they . . . that the timely arrival of some mysterious arms merchant can mean survival of one regime or the fall of another. . . ."

One week last March, 240 Americans were killed in Viet Nam. During the same week in Latin America, where undeclared guerrilla warfare rages in half-a-dozen countries, the death toll was near 300.

These guerrilla conflicts are no longer waged with fowling pieces and cane blades. "The guerrillas are as well armed as the government troops," the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency revealed recently. "Often, the guerrillas' weapons are more modern. And they fire thousands of rounds in each encounter."

The regular armies, in turn, are growing anxious to reestablish their traditional overwhelming superiority in firepower. Hard pressed, they are turning to controversial ordnance—napalm, harsh nauseous gases, special infantry rockets built to smash entire houses—which must often be bought in the black market.

Down briefly from its World War II peaks, the munitions business began to rise again in the late 1940's. For a while, however, large well-organized corporations controlled most of it. A firm called Interarmco, for example, had become a worldwide octopus by 1958. Independent operators found that it was often possible to cooperate with Interarmco, but seldom to compete with it. Then in the late spring of 1958, the U.S. State De-

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"This is okay, but when are you going to teach me to chase wimmen?"

partment did an odd, little-publicized thing: it suddenly revoked licenses to export munitions to the Cuban government of President Batista.

General Batista had long been one of Washington's favorite clients, but Cuba was racked by internal disorders. The State Department had decided as a political gesture to curtail the flow of arms to him. By 1958 the official U.S. line on selling firearms had become completely confused. An old friend would be suddenly denied a paid-up munitions shipment, an ostensible outcast in, say, the Middle East, would be suddenly invited to bid on some coveted hardware.

The great corporations were hamstrung by the State Department's vacillations. Independent ordnance salesmen moved into the vacuum. Less troubled by red tape and day-to-day policy changes, they were prepared to make deals and deliver goods swiftly. A new prototype of global gun merchant emerged—the successful munitions manipulator. He came wearing custom-made English tropicals and a platinum-banded watch. He talked in the vernacular of the British officers' mess, adopted by the whole international firearms fraternity.

M.M.'s cover a broad spectrum. They range from the officially licensed, eminently respectable WerBell to a mysterious, Hungarian-born munitions salesman, whose lifelong skill in using false documents is believed to have inspired the Continental underworld term *Hundertpasser*, i.e. man of a hundred passports.

With some exceptions, successful M.M.'s seem to share an upper-class or military background. They often arrive at the munitions business through years of devotion to firearms as gun collectors or tinkerers. Mitch WerBell was still a gun hobbyist, who planted and shipped tropical fruits for a living when he developed—in his home workshop—what is today considered the finest muzzle silencer on the international market.

Sure political instinct and diplomatic skill are essential in the successful manipulation of munitions.

Andrew McNaughton, scion of Canada's most distinguished military dynasty and a former RAF squadron leader turned arms dealer, explained: "The fellows who got somewhere in this business all started out with a common insight. The big corporations had grown used to dealing with governments, but the independents, who were a lot smaller and quicker on their feet, recognized that it was easier to deal with government *departments*.

"Someone, say, had a nice order for machine guns . . . from, perhaps, a group of Kurdish freedom fighters who carry their hundred-dollar bills rolled as thick as a telephone book. Then he had a nice offer from, say, an arms firm in Hamburg to fill the order: MG-34 machine guns, almost as good as new—*better* than some—a spare breech thrown in for $220 each, belted ammo with it, tracer-spaced, $25 per thousand rounds—everything very nice. Except that to move the shipment out of West Germany and around the world, you needed a quiet little okay from Washington. Why? Because that's the way modern bloc politics works, I suppose. Anyhow, you went to Washington, clear-eyed and trusting, and the State Department said, 'No.'

"Now the big corporation might try a little wire-pulling. If it got another 'No,' it might quit for a while. But the independents had discovered that if you got a 'No' from the State Department, you could often go to the CIA, or the DIA, the military intelligence establishment, and get a 'Yes'—provided you were small enough and savvy enough to do it quietly and kick no furniture on the way. Of course, it is a bit riskier this way, turning the trick. You have to charge more. But then you often make a bit more, too."

This seems to be a point on which most M.M.'s agree. Charles Mevs, a philosophical Haitian ("Indicted, but never convicted, my friend!") put it this way: "Everyone knows that small countries are changeable. They have many subsequent governments. A lot of the big corporations had learned to live with that. But the small independents appreciated something else—that big powers tend to have many *simultaneous* governments."

Mevs grinned a huge, white, triumphant grin. "It's the same East and West. Think not? Russia? England? France? No difference, my friend. Remember last year the Moroccan government went to the French Foreign Office trying to extradite one of their exiles, Ben Barka? Yes? And the French Foreign Office said, '*Non, non*, our traditions of political asylum . . . the sacred freedom of choice . . . and *patati*, and *patata*.' So the Moroccans went to the invisible government, to French Intelligence. And they made a little deal. And French Intelligence just said, 'How d'you want this Ben Barka delivered, bagged or crated?' Eh? No difference, my friend."

It is a fact, shared by governmental insiders around the world, that great-power politics have seen a resurgence of old-fashioned Machiavellianism. Take the curious case of John Richard Hawke, 29, a bearded Britisher from Cornwall who, after eight years in the RAF, has turned up as an M.M. doing ferry flying by appointment—bomber planes and bomb-sights a specialty.

One day early last year, Eugenie Anderson, a U.S. representative in the United Nations, spoke in the General Assembly. She seemed to be promising that this man Hawke would go to prison for a long, long time. It appeared a curious UN undertaking—Hawke had not yet been convicted of anything. He still hasn't been. But the background of the matter illuminates the workings of modern munitions dealings.

Portugal, a NATO member in need of some ground-support planes for its forces in Angola and Mozambique, had approached Washington with a request to buy 29 B-26 Invader bombers. At the State Department's suggestion, the request was turned down; the U.S., in the United Nations, had promised not to purvey supplies for "colonial warfare." But there were other agencies in Washington more favorably disposed to Portugal, perhaps because they were troubled by the Angolan guerrillas, perhaps [illegible] other reasons. At any rate, the situation was tailor-made for experienced M.M.'s. The total deal involved over three [illegible] lion dollars.

There now appeared a disting[illegible] French aristocrat, wearing the *Le[illegible] Honneur*; a hard-bodied Australi[illegible] craft broker operating from [illegible] some mechanics [illegible] a risk [illegible]

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("Sparrow"); some special radio rigs for clandestine communications, and a pilot: John Hawke. In short order Hawke was flying over the Atlantic in the first of the seven bombers he was to deliver to Portugal in less than three months. Ostensibly headed for Bordeaux, France, he flew instead to a Portuguese air base where he was met by the Comte de Beaumont, representing a Swiss munitions firm.

Hawke was paid $5,000 for each flight. Although expenses ate up two thirds of the fee, the deal seemed satisfactory. "Those planes had bomb racks, armor plating, ready gunports—there could be no question in anyone's mind what they were for," he told a visitor recently in Miami. Nevertheless, a question of sorts arose in *some* minds. One day Hawke was arrested and charged with violating the U.S. Munitions Act by exporting bombers without written State Department approval.

At the trial, the prosecution maintained that the United States government had neither known about, nor countenanced Hawke's flights. The pilot had a lone defender: Edwin Marger, a Miami lawyer-pilot, who has been developing munitions law into a specialty. Marger proved that U.S. intelligence did have tacit knowledge of the plane exports to Portugal.

Ferrying his third B-26, Hawke had flown into a pea-soup fog over Washington and blundered across a prohibited zone over the White House. The Federal Aviation Agency radioed up an urgent order to land. When Hawke put the B-26 down at Washington National Airport, he was inspected and questioned. By using the code word "Sparrow," Hawke got clearance to continue his flight. After Hawke's arrest, there seemed to be no proof that the incident ever occurred. The original FAA report of the incident had mysteriously vanished. But Marger finally managed to come up with a copy of the report. Together with the Customs declaration for the same plane, it proved the lawyer's point sufficiently to bring an acquittal.

"The jury realized some official hanky-panky must have been involved," Marger explained, "and they felt Hawke should not be made the goat."

Marger, however, appreciates the American dilemma: "Keep in mind," he says, "what a variety of roles a great power must play. In the UN it must play the benign anticolonialist. At an international conference, the principled pacifist. In the legislature, the protector of its domestic armaments industry, whose congressional friends resent restrictions on exports. In a secret emergency meeting with some battle-weary Latin president, it must be the powerful antiguerrilla leader. In its own National Security Council, it must be the champion of worldwide strategic interests. And so forth—there's no way to reconcile all this in public. That's where the M.M.'s come in, and very usefully, too."

Such geopolitical factors do not concern most munitions merchants. Dominick de Fekete von Altbach und Nagyrevath is an arms dealer who in name and background seems straight out of a Graustarkian novel. A former cavalry subaltern of the Royal Hungarian Horse Artillery, he worked his way up in the firearms business because it satisfied his two lifelong interests: guns and money.

After World War II, De Fekete, a shrewd, handsome cosmopolite who spoke five languages, rose to quick eminence in the European contraband business. In the early fifties, he moved his headquarters to South America and turned to the munitions business. He concentrated on foolproof methods of delivering contraband by sea.

De Fekete's clientele was divided equally between rebels and governments—frequently in the same country.

"With rebels you have an easier sale," he once told a friend. "They want whatever you can get for them. But with governments you have an easier delivery."

Such an expert trader along the "Mosquito Coast" as Andrew McNaughton confirms that doing business with arms-hungry banana regimes demands a rather large variety of special skills. "The first time I went to Cuba—before Castro—with a very nice list of secondhand military merchandise," McNaughton recalled, "I thought it would be a simple sales deal. But it wasn't.

"I was offering first-rate stuff at bargain prices," McNaughton explained, "Belgian ceramic-jacketed hand grenades by the hundred at $1.75 each; surplus Garands with spare clips at $41; English Staghound armored cars under $11,000. It was precisely what the Cubans needed and the generals with whom I had daily meetings could barely conceal their interest.

"Then, one evening there was a knock on my hotel room door. It was the Cuban C in C's secretary, Pancho. He told me my wares were satisfactory, but why hadn't I given the general a price list? 'What do you mean?' I said. 'We've been talking prices for five days.' Pancho just grinned. 'You know, McNaughton,' he said, 'you're an imbecile, but you're a pilot and I like pilots—I'm a pilot myself. Let me show you what a price list is.' "

In the tropical weapons trade, McNaughton learned a "price list" is the most important sales gimmick. For each item, three different prices must be listed. One is the current market price of the item in question, brand-new, retail: for an M-1 rifle this might be $100. The second price shows the amount for which the weapon had been purchased: in the case of an M-1 rifle, offered as surplus by a government which had bought it in 1946 and warehoused it ever since, the original price may have been a lot lower, say $80. The third figure is the real sales price which the salesman is asking for his surplus item—in the case of the same rifle, this real sales price might be $50.

"To close the deal, you must conclude by making up two bills of sale," said McNaughton. "One lists the current, brand-new market price—this goes to the general's auditors. The second bill of sale

TRUE



"First, let me congratulate everyone for the fine turnout. . . ."

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It is the surplus price, the real price you're getting—this goes into the general's pocket. Into the general's pocket also goes the difference between the two prices—in the case of the hypothetical M-1, $50 on each rifle."

The staple of the private arms trade is the assortment of weapons known as Old Reliables. These are hardy perennial items of ordnance which sell steadily everywhere from the Congo to Cochabamba. There is, for example, the 20mm. automatic cannon, priced anywhere from $100 to $650. Delivery price will depend on condition, availability, accessibility of ammunition and shipment difficulties (open or clandestine?).

Other longtime favorites are the Browning Automatic Rifle (from $65 to $350); the big-bang M-1 Garand rifle ($10 to $155); the Enfield No. 4, popular because of its low price (around $25); the Madsen .30 cal. machine gun ($200 to $550); the infantryman's Big Daddy: the .50 cal. Browning machine gun ($100 to $1,000), and the 57mm. recoilless rifle, which will convert a launch into a warship at close range and in the jungle can make a guerrilla platoon's firepower equal regimental artillery (from $1,400 to $3,000). Mobile perennials are the B-26 bomber, the Staghound armored car and the T-28 jet trainer.

But it is the modern, hard-to-get weapons, kept in short supply by political considerations, which are in greatest demand. The U.S.-developed M-79 grenade launcher, which looks and handles like a stout, single-barrel shotgun but fires a 40mm. grenade shell or bazooka rocket with riflelike accuracy, commands up to $1,700, ammo extra. There is great interest in the science-fiction MBA rocket guns which fire small, self-guided ballistic missiles at twice the velocity of the blockbuster magnum cartridges—and without explosion or recoil. The experimental *[illegible]* playing light bombs, which explode with a cloudburst of thousands of tiny balls, are coveted by militarists and "freedom fighters" alike, as are the fantastic new image-intensifying and heat-seeking superscopes, which let the rifleman see and shoot as well at midnight as at noon.

This curious mixture of old and new weapons is reflected in the personality of the successful M.M.'s. For all their "passionate" interest in munitions technology, their personal outlook tends to be curiously old-fashioned. Perhaps because of an inner identification with adventurous types of a bygone past, they tend to affect charming, eccentric turn-of-the-century manners. This is true even of such old-style pistol-packing characters as Rolando Masferrer, who is often called the Caribbean's most feared gang lord. An astonishingly literate, brilliant, erratic Cuban who was raised in the United States and graduated at the head of his law school class, Masferrer has been fascinated by violence since his first taste of it at 19, in the Spanish Civil War. He left half his left foot in Spain, but came out of the hospital an officer of the International Brigade and for years afterward lived the life of an international Communist Party enforcer.

After World War II, Masferrer swung to the right and became a newspaper tycoon, senator, cattle magnate and overlord of the Caribbean's biggest gang of gunmen. Now living in the United States, he is a colorful demonstration of the mysterious ways of munitions manipulation. While officially restricted to residence in the State of New York, he managed to equip, in Miami, a 300-man Haiti invasion army with everything from infantry boots to a B-25 bomber. Now under indictment for this stunt, Masferrer is awaiting trial in the Miami Federal court.

The last time the U.S. government tried to convict him on similar charges, he got the case thrown out of court—much like Hawke—by pointing out that "I wasn't doing anything the government was not doing, too."

Other hazards in the trade can be more worrying. Since the Korean War, at least 20—and possibly twice as many—M.M.'s have been murdered. The "Red Hand," a notorious French right-wing organization, is believed to have killed seven private arms dealers in five countries simply to keep down the flow of arms to Algerian rebels during the last years of French colonial warfare. One of them, a Swiss ammunition dealer named Maurice Leopold, was killed with a poisoned arrow.

Masferrer usually carries under his arm a paper bag containing reading material, some Ramon Allones cigars, and a fully loaded National Match Colt .45 automatic pistol. His two bodyguards carry the same model of pistol in empty cigar boxes, which they place beside their napkins when dining in a restaurant.


Right now Africa, where live bullets have been known to replace coins as the preferred tender, is the most fertile private firearms market. Latin America comes next, with a huge turnover in hardware of every kind. Comparative volume is hard to establish, because the same firearms travel back and forth repeatedly, from country to country, continent to continent, wherever supply and demand may take them.

The trajectory of such firearms from factory to firing line can be fantastically far-flung. The following history has been put together of a 20mm. cannon sold to Haitian rebels last year. The cannon was made in Finland during World War II and used on the Soviet front. In the late forties, it was sold in a lot to an Interarmco agent in exchange for some carloads of Sten guns. Shipped to Italy, it was taken over by Dominick de Fekete in one of his first weapons ventures and sold to the Israeli Haganah. In 1950 it returned to De Fekete in the mixed lot of surplus Israeli hardware consigned to Costa Rica. In 1955, it made a second transatlantic trip, back to the Mediterranean, where agents of the Algerian FLN were waiting for it in Tunis. In 1960 it went overseas again, to Panama, and thence north to the United States in a shipload officially described as "Deactivated War Souvenirs." It was then sold to Cuban rebels for delivery by air-drop to the Sierra Escambray mountains, but something went wrong with the delivery and the cannon ended up firing instead in Santo Domingo. In 1965 it was brought back to Miami in a mysterious converted subchaser known as the *Texana*. Later the same year, it was acquired by Rolando Masferrer. In mid-1966, Masferrer sold it, in a mixed boatload of light weapons, to a group of rebels preparing to invade Haiti under the leadership of a Catholic priest.

In a quarter of a century, the cannon has seen action in a half dozen wars—big and small—and brought sizable profits to each M.M. who has bought and sold it. And how do these arms dealers feel about their business?

Mitch WerBell summed up the attitude of the fraternity when he told a visitor recently:

"Please don't call me a 'merchant of death.' All it is really, is that I've been fond of guns all my life. Guns don't kill people; people kill people, and always have, long before anyone invented the gun."—Andrew St. George



"Hello, Harry? Fine. I'd like to apologize for saying I couldn't marry you if you were the last man on earth. . ."

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FBI document dated
11 May '67
re: Wer Bell, Mitchell —
Haiti

14-00000

FBI document dated
2 May 1967 from New York
re: Ralph Lauro Serrano

14-00000

FBI document dated
12 June 1967 from New York
re: Chet Gray

FBI document dated
11 JAN '67
re: Wer Bell, Mitchell Livingston, III